


MEND manifesto

Mayor of London and London Assembly elections 2016



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Introduction

The election of the Mayor of London and 25 members of the Greater London Assembly on Thursday 5 May presents a renewed opportunity for Londoners of all backgrounds to engage with the governing institutions for the capital and the regional elected representatives who hold the Mayor to account.

London is home to almost 40% of the UK's Muslim population making the 2016 election of the Mayor and London Assembly Members of acute importance to Muslim residents in the capital. Housing, health, education, employment, crime and security and the cost of living in the capital, these are all issues that affect London's diverse communities and Muslim communities in particular given their concentration in the capital.

London's Black and Minority Ethnic population grew between 2001 and 2011 from 25.3% to 40.2%. Muslims form 12.4% of London's population with the population growing by 67% between the two census periods, 2001 to 2011. The rate of growth is high compared to the growth in London's total population growth in the period (14%) but low compared to other conurbations in the UK with large Muslim population density and which saw increases between 72 to 111 percent in the same period.

In 2015, 26.6% of all students in compulsory education in secondary schools were from BME backgrounds, well above the overall BME population size in the 2011 Census (14.1%). Primary school pupils in London from a BME background made up 71.7% of the total school population in 2015. At secondary level, they made up 68.6%. This is in contrast to the overall London overall BME population of 40.2%.

Muslims make up 2 in 5 of the local population in two London Boroughs, Tower Hamlets (45.6%) and Newham (40.1%) and 1 in 5 in Boroughs such as Brent, Enfield, Redbridge and Waltham Forest.



London's demographic profile makes the 2016 elections acutely pertinent to minority communities. Not least because London's diversity and its success as a capital city thrives on its intercultural, interreligious, and inter-ethnic character. As the UK's most ethnically diverse faith group, Muslim Londoners fully embrace the capital's vibrant multicultural landscape. But the character of London as a successful, multicultural city belies many of the problems facing the capital's minority communities from lower life expectancy and poor health to overcrowded housing and a lower relative ratio of educational attainment to employment.

On some of the issues that matter to all Londoners - housing, education, employment and health – Muslims suffer inequalities across the board. Whereas 53% of Londoners aged 16-24 from White British backgrounds are in employment, just 33% of BME Londoners in the same category are in employment.

As a capital city, London is under particular threat from international terrorism as we have seen in recent months in Paris and Brussels. For Muslim Londoners, the threat from international terrorism intersects with domestic terrorism as Muslims face a 'spike' in reprisal attacks resulting from 'trigger events'. Islamophobic hate crime in the capital rose eightfold in the weeks following the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby in May 2013 and threefold after the Paris attacks in November 2015.

The 2016 elections in London are an opportunity to elect officials who will commit themselves to alleviating the sustained inequalities facing minority groups and to delivering a better quality of life to all Londoners whatever their racial, religious or ethnic background.



According to the Home Office report on Hate Crime in England and Wales in 2014/15, 42.4% of all religious hate crime recorded in the UK occurred in London. In the same period, London accounted for 28% of all police recorded hate crime motivated by racial or religious hostility. For Muslim residents in the capital, strategies to tackle Islamophobia are of paramount importance.

These are fundamental issues that require considered policy interventions from housing policy and education services to crime, policing and counter-terrorism.

This manifesto has been developed to encourage British Muslim participation in the London mayoral and London Assembly elections by making policy initiatives and their impact more accessible to Muslim voters.

The 2016 elections in London are an opportunity to elect officials who will commit themselves to alleviating the sustained inequalities facing minority groups and to delivering a better quality of life to all Londoners whatever their racial, religious or ethnic background.



Executive Summary

The election of the Mayor of London and 25 members of the Greater London Assembly on Thursday 5 May presents a renewed opportunity for Londoners of all backgrounds to engage with the governing institution for the capital and the elected representatives who hold the Mayor to account.

London is home to almost 40% of the UK's Muslim population making the 2016 election of the Mayor and Assembly Members of acute importance to Muslim residents in the capital. Housing, health, education, employment, crime and security and the cost of living in the capital, these are all issues that affect London's diverse communities, and Muslim communities in particular given their concentration in the capital.

According to the Home Office report on Hate Crime in England and Wales in 2014/15, 42.4% of all religious hate crime recorded in the UK occurred in London. In the same period, London accounted for 28% of all police recorded hate crime motivated by racial or religious hostility. For Muslim residents in the capital, strategies to tackle Islamophobia are of paramount importance.

The significance of London as a capital city and the enhanced security threat it faces presents challenges to efforts by the Mayor of London and the Metropolitan Police Service to protect residents while promoting social cohesion, social justice and human rights.

The key issues covered here can be summarised as racial and religious equality, transparency, accountability, crime reduction and civil liberties.

The main points are:

- Data collection on anti-Muslim hate crime is inadequate and fails to reflect the true scale of Islamophobic hate crime occurring in the UK.
- The introduction in April 2016 of a new recording process which will see Islamophobia recorded as a separate category of crime provides a further opportunity for the MPS to address hate crime reporting systems and accurate data collection on Islamophobia.
- Recording anti-Muslim hate crime relies upon proper training of police officers to correctly identify the bias motivation and to consider the victim's perception of the perpetrator's hostility. The introduction of the new recording system must be coupled with better training for officers.
- Third party reporting centres play a vital role in marginalised communities who may struggle to report hate crime incidents directly at their local police station. Our assessment of third party reporting centres in England and Wales shows that provisions for Muslim communities is far from satisfactory. Working with Muslim communities across the capital to improve provisions for hate crime reporting must be a priority in the Mayor of London's hate crime strategy.
- The announcement by the Prime Minister of new funding to be made available for security measures at "faith establishments" is welcome and local Muslim communities in the capital must be supported in funding applications to secure premises such as local mosques and Muslim schools from Islamophobic attacks.
- The far right continues to present a major threat to Muslim communities with convictions for murder, assault and arson serving as a reminder of the criminal actions of individuals motivated by anti-Muslim hostility. Low level intimidation that accompanies on-street protests by far right groups in towns and cities across the country and the drain on police budgets of policing protests is a further area that needs attention by the Mayor of London and the GLA.
- Despite suggested recommendations on the use of stop and search powers and the threat of statutory legislation to limit its use in a bid to improve stop-to-arrest ratios and curtail disproportionate use against ethnic minorities, stop and search continues to show evidence of 'institutional racism'. Muslim communities continue to face disproportionate use of terrorism

stop and search powers, Section 43 (TACT 2000) and Schedule 7 stops and search. The impact on community policing of the excesses which fall foul of the 'Best use of stop and search scheme' will need careful attention to enforce compliance and to tackle 'unconscious bias'.

- The Vision 2020 strategy, which supports BME communities in employment, education, apprenticeships and recruitment to the police force sets ambitious targets for increasing diversity in police recruitment. Small steps have been taken by some forces to open up recruitment to BME applicants with recorded improvements in the MPS, but figures show that the police force remains predominantly White. Achieving the targets in the Vision 2020 strategy will require greater drive to increase recruitment and considered attention on retention and progression if BME communities are to be better represented at all ranks.
- Consultative forums in the form of Independent Advisory Groups are a brilliant mechanism to provide police with 'critical friends' and a broad range of advice during 'critical incidents' but while IAGs are intended to reflect communities in the force area, a lack of transparency on composition renders it difficult to ascertain whether communities are indeed represented, and by whom. Greater transparency is vital to ensuring IAGs perform effectively in the purpose for which they are designed: a forum for dialogue between a local force and the local community.
- One of the most troubled areas of police relationships with Muslim communities relates to their role in the delivery of Prevent; a strand of the counter-terrorism strategy.
- The introduction of a statutory duty on Prevent across a range of specified authorities such as schools, hospitals, prisons, probation services, universities and local authorities has extended the 'securitisation' of relations between police officers and local communities. Interaction is most keenly felt in relation to Channel, the controversial programme which deals with individuals deemed 'at risk' of 'vulnerability to radicalisation'.
- We have found that the number of Channel referrals for children aged 10 and under and 11 to 15 (inc) has increased by 700% and 258% respectively in the period 2007 - March 2012 and 1 April 2012 - 10 Dec 2015. The MPS accounted for 4% and 12.5% of children aged 10 and below and 11-15 (inc), respectively who were referred to the Channel programme between April 2012 and 10 Dec 2015.
- While the MPS compares favourably to other forces in relation to Channel referrals, questions about the quality of training provided to agencies and frontline officers to prepare them for the enforcement of the statutory duty and the basis on which referrals to the Channel programme are made have come under sustained scrutiny as stories abound about pupils being spoken to by Prevent officers without parental consent or being referred to the Channel programme for innocent mix ups in spelling or speech. Campaigners in two London Boroughs, Newham and Waltham Forest, have rejected the Prevent programme as 'stigmatising' Muslim children and alienating Muslim communities.
- Data on Channel referrals is frequently denied when requested under Freedom of Information. Data disclosed by the National Police Chiefs Council shows that only 1 in 5 of those referred to the Channel programme between April 2007 and March 2014 required "supportive interventions." That means 80% of referrals exited the system at the preliminary assessment stage. This is a unusually high number of unwarranted referrals raising serious questions about training quality and impact on innocent victims.
- The available Channel referral data also reveals the high proportion of referrals that come from the education sector, compared to all other sectors. 75% and 68% of all Channel referrals of children aged 10 and under and 11 - 15 between April 2012 and 10 Dec 2015 came from the education sector. Fears among Muslim Londoners about racial profiling in the education sector are real and palpable.

- Publishing Channel data on the MOPAC and MPS websites on an annual basis can bring much needed transparency to this area of policing and can guard against intrusive inquiries and unjustified referrals to a counter-terrorism intervention programme.
- Crime reduction is a priority for all Londoners and upholding the Met's budget to tackle crime in the capital as cuts roll out over the next mayoral term will remain a priority for the capital's residents.
- London boasts an illustrious cultural scene and figures show that the number of people from minority ethnic backgrounds visiting museums or galleries has increased from 35.4% in 2005/06 to 42.9% in 2014/15. But the number of visitors from high socio-economic backgrounds exceeded the number from low socio-economic backgrounds; 60% and 38.9% respectively in 2014/15.
- Museums in London have in recent years engaged in programmes or hosted exhibitions to extend their visitor base among BME communities and these initiatives should be further encouraged by the Mayor's office to facilitate the use of the capital's arts and culture scene to bring diverse communities together.
- London has the highest public transport costs compared to other major capital cities around the world and the high cost of travel affects those on low incomes more. This has consequences for health, prosperity and well-being. Tackling fare rises for public transport services in London and making services run more efficiently will be a challenge that will need to be addressed.
- Housing costs in the capital is one of the most important policy areas for Londoners. For Muslim Londoners, the cost of housing is coupled with related concerns about overcrowding, low level of owner-occupied dwellings and the concentration of Muslims in the private and social rented sector. Delivering on building affordable housing and re-creating a BME Housing Strategy for London will be necessary to address housing problems facing Muslim Londoners.
- Muslims are more likely to suffer from 'bad' or 'very bad' health at all groups compared to the general population. For Muslims in London, almost twice as many in the age group 16-49 report 'bad' or 'very bad' health compared to the general population, 4.7% and 2.7% respectively. These disparities are reflected in other age groups with 22% of Muslims aged 50-64 reporting 'bad' or 'very bad' health and 32.2% of Muslims aged 65+ compared to 9.9% and 17.2% of the general population respectively.
- London's BME primary school population in 2015 numbered 402,218 out of a total of 561,307, or 71.7%. At secondary school level, BME students were 329,492 out of a total of 480,367, or 68.6%. This is higher than the overall BME population in London, 40.2%.
- Education attainment levels among Muslim pupils in London have improved significantly since 2001 but an attainment gap remains between Inner and Outer London with Muslims in Inner London falling 10 percentage points behind the general population with Level 4 qualifications and above (18.1% and 28.1% respectively).
- Muslims continue to face disproportionately high levels of unemployment when comparing labour market outcomes across social groups with equal levels in education and qualifications. With London's primacy in the UK economy, the capital is well-placed to seriously tackle Muslim discrimination in the labour market and improve the correlation between rising educational attainment levels among young Muslims and employment outcomes. The Mayor of London's office should create a taskforce to examine Muslim labour market discrimination in the capital and work with public and private sector employers to tackle the high levels of unemployment among Muslim Londoners.

Manifesto pledges

- Commit to a training programme for Metropolitan Police Service officers to properly identify and record anti-Muslim hate crime.
- Commit to evaluating third party reporting centres in all London Boroughs and improve provisions for Muslims to report hate crime in their local area.
- Commit to appointing an officer with speciality training on racial and religious hate crime to work with Muslim communities in all London Boroughs to improve hate crime reporting, incident investigation and community partnerships.
- Commit to supporting improvements to security at Islamic places of worship and Muslim schools across the capital.
- Commit to addressing the threat posed by far right groups and right wing extremism, including on-street protests and social media forums that foment anti-Muslim prejudice.
- Commit to improving Muslim participation in consultative forums including in Independent Advisory Groups across London Boroughs and on the London Hate Crime Panel.
- Commit to tackling religious discrimination in the workplace and address the low level of economic activity among Muslims through targeted interventions at stages of recruitment, retention and promotion.
- Commit to establishing a taskforce to examine Muslim labour market discrimination in the capital and work with public and private sector employers to tackle the high levels of unemployment among Muslim Londoners.
- Commit to delivering the recommendations proposed by the London Health Commission to address health problems among BME groups and the higher proportion of Muslim Londoners reporting 'bad' or very bad' health compared to the general population in all age groups.
- Commit to building affordable housing in the capital to meet housing needs and re-creating a BME Housing Strategy for London to address specific housing problems facing Muslim Londoners.
- Commit to supporting improvements in educational attainment levels among BME groups, including Pakistanis and Bangladeshi pupils in the capital's schools and address remaining disparities in the attainment gap between Inner and Outer London.
- Commit to supporting London Boroughs in developing teaching materials to educate young people on Islamophobia, racism, and anti-Semitism; to fund projects to promote educational programmes on Islam awareness; to prioritise religious education in the national curriculum in order to prepare young people for life in a religiously plural, vibrant capital city.
- Commit to strengthening powers of teachers to deal with racist and Islamophobic bullying in schools in the capital; support the education sector in developing Islamophobia awareness programmes for teaching staff to equip them with skills to identify and tackle hate incidents in schools.
- Commit to tackling fare rises for public transport services and making services run more efficiently to address the adverse effects of high public transport costs on all Londoners, and particularly those on low incomes.
- Commit to fostering social cohesion and community resilience to all forms of extremism; support de-radicalisation programmes that work with Muslim communities not against them.

- Commit to curbing the encroachment of counter-terrorism policies on civil liberties.
- Commit to enforcing the 10 recommendations proposed by HMIC on improving the use of stop and search and compliance with the 'Best use of stop and search scheme'.
- Commit to train officers in detecting 'unconscious bias' to improve stop and search 'hit rates' and consistently demonstrate grounds for 'reasonable suspicion'
- Commit to increasing recruitment, retention and promotion of BME officers with clear plans to improve diversity in senior ranks of the Metropolitan Police Service.
- Commit to publishing comprehensive data on Channel referrals annually on the MOPAC and MPS websites.
- Commit to holding regular public meetings with local communities in order to dispel the lack of transparency about Prevent delivery and to enhance trust and confidence in police roles on programme delivery.
- Commit to supporting London's museums and galleries in outreach initiatives to BME communities thereby extending their visitor base to include marginalised groups and facilitate the use of the capital's arts and culture scene to bring diverse communities together by organising more exhibitions and cultural events about Islam and British Muslims.





Background

The Greater London Authority Act passed in 1999 paved the way for an elected city government (the GLA) consisting of a Mayor and 25 Assembly members all of whom are elected on a four year cycle.

Mayor of London

The Mayor of London is accountable for the strategic governance of the Greater London region.

The Mayor of London holds all of the executive power in the GLA, but certain key actions can be prevented by the London Assembly who act as scrutinisers. The Assembly may amend the Mayor's annual budget, or a Mayoral strategy, on a two-thirds majority. Other than this, it has no **sanctions with which to stop the Mayor taking action**.

The budget for 2015/16 was **£16.7 billion**, an increase from **£15 Billion** in 2012.¹

The House of Commons Library notes that the GLA has widely differing levels of power in different policy areas. The majority of its spending, and hence the main focus of Mayoral policy is in transport, followed by housing, policing, economic development and regeneration. These are matters covered by the functional bodies, which are sometimes informally known as the 'GLA family'.²

The budget is split between the Greater London Authority, and the four functional bodies that carry out its, and the mayor's main responsibilities. The four bodies are:

- Transport for London, TfL (**Transport**)
- Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime, MOPAC (**Policing**)
- London Fire And Emergency Planning Authority (**Fire and Emergency**)
- London Legacy Development Corporation (**Economic Development**)

Functions of the Mayor differ across policy areas. For the functional bodies above, it is the duty of the Mayor to appoint board members and set their budgets and strategy. He therefore has **full authority** over them (though most of the funding comes direct from the Treasury and is limited to use in a specific area).

The Mayor is also involved in **planning** and responsible for producing a Spatial Development Strategy. He also has powers to intervene in planning applications of 'potential strategic importance'.

Housing is another area of responsibility. Under the Localism Act 2011, housing strategy and funding was devolved from the Homes and Communities Agency to the GLA.

The Mayor is also under **statutory duty to produce** seven strategy documents covering the areas of policy competency: transport, economic development, housing, spatial development (the London Plan), environment, culture and health inequalities. Each strategy is expected to set a direction of travel for London as a whole, not just the GLA. The Mayor has executive responsibilities over housing, transport and economic development, but in other areas covered by the other strategies, s/he has no power to direct public bodies outside the GLA family to follow the strategy.

The Mayor and the GLA also 'has a general power of competence' which can be used to promote economic and social development, and improve environmental conditions in London.³ It is therefore expected that the Mayor extends his/her influence beyond the executive functions, particularly through 'providing leadership to a wide range of actors across London'.⁴

1. 'Boris's Budget 2015-16: how the London mayor will make ends meet', The Guardian, 06 January 2015.

2. Sanford M. (2015) The Greater London Authority Briefing Papers. Number 05817.

3. Ibid

4. Ibid

The Mayor of London elections will take place on 5 May 2016

The Mayor of London is elected by the ‘**supplementary vote system**’. Each London voter has a first and second choice vote. If a candidate receives over half of all first choice votes they will be elected immediately. If this does not occur, the two candidates with the most first choice votes go through to a second round where the second choice votes of those who have had their first choice candidate eliminated are counted. Any votes for the remaining two candidates are added to their first round totals. The candidate with the highest combined total is elected as Mayor of London.

The London Assembly Elections will take place on 5 May 2016

Formed in 2000, the Greater London Authority (GLA) is a unique form of government made up of the Mayor of London, the London Assembly and its non-political staff who support the Authority.

Of the 25 Assembly members, **14 represent** London’s **14 constituencies** (made up of 2-4 boroughs and can be seen on the map below) and **11 are known as London-wide Members** who represent the whole of London. They are elected at the same time as the Mayor.

A ‘**first past the post**’ system is used to elect the 14 Constituency London Assembly Members. The candidate in each constituency with the most votes is elected as a Constituency London Assembly Member.

The 11 London-wide Assembly Members are elected using a form of ‘**Proportional representation**’. Votes from across London for the London-wide Assembly Members are added together. A formula is then used to allocate the 11 seats, taking into account the total votes cast in the London-wide ballot together with the number of Constituency London Assembly Member seats each political party has already won. This voting system is used to ensure the overall Assembly reflects London’s election results.⁵



5. Counting the Votes, (updated 2016) London Elects. Available at: <<http://www.londonelects.org.uk/im-voter/counting-votes>> [accessed 10 January 2016].

The London Assembly does not take decisions itself but instead holds the Mayor to account, including reviewing the decisions the Mayor takes. In fulfilling its role, it has specific powers to:

- Scrutinise Mayoral functions and review matters of interest to Londoners
- Consider the proposed designation of Mayoral Development Areas
- Consider Mayoral Strategies and the GLA budget
- Appoint three statutory officers, together with the Mayor
- Hold confirmation hearings for key functional body appointments⁶

The Greater London Authority (GLA) is a unique authority in the government of the UK. Although it is often described as an example of devolution, inviting parallels with the Scottish Parliament, National Assembly for Wales and Northern Ireland Assembly, its powers are very limited compared to these devolved bodies.

For instance, London's services in health, education, social care, arts and culture, and environmental protection are all delivered by bodies **other** than the GLA.

Nor is the GLA a conventional local authority: for some purposes it is defined as one in the 1999 Act, but there are many important differences. Local authority mayors must select a cabinet on the council and must have their budget passed by a majority on the council; their decisions may also be called in by the council. These requirements **do not** apply to the GLA.

Similarly, it is **not an upper tier local authority** with service delivery responsibilities like county councils. This role is still fulfilled by the London boroughs, which are unitary local authorities.

As the GLA's executive, decision making rests primarily with the Mayor, and some of the decisions the Mayor is required by law to take personally. In other cases, the Mayor delegates decisions to senior GLA staff or the Mayoral team.

The responsibilities of the GLA are: Housing; Strategic planning; Transport planning; Passenger transport; Highways; and Fire.

These responsibilities differ from the duties performed by the 32 London Boroughs whose responsibilities extend to cover Education; Planning applications; Social services; Libraries; Leisure and recreation; Waste collection; Waste disposal; Environmental health and Revenue collection (Council tax).

The table below shows the various committees within the London Assembly and the policy areas they are tasked with overseeing:⁷

Committee	Policy Areas Overseen
Economy Committee	Scrutinises the work of the Mayor relating to economic development, wealth creation, social development, culture, and sport and tourism in London.
Education Panel	Review and Investigate the development and delivery of the Mayor's education policies.
Environment Committee	Examines all aspects of London's environment through reviewing the Mayor's strategies for sustainability and the environment.

6. Mayor of London and London Assembly (updated 2016) Greater London Authority Decision Making. Available at: <://www.london.gov.uk/about-us/greater-london-authority-gla/good-governance/decision-making> [accessed 20 February 2016].

7. Mayor of London and London Assembly (updated 2016) London Assembly Committees. Available at <https://www.london.gov.uk/about-us/london-assembly/london-assembly-committees> [accessed 07 April 2016].

Health Committee	Reviews health and wellbeing across London with a particular focus on public health issues and reviewing progress of the Mayor's Health Inequalities Strategy.
Housing Committee	The Housing Committee scrutinises the Mayor's role and record in delivering the private, social and affordable homes London needs.
Planning Committee	The role of this Committee is to scrutinise the detail of the Mayor's London Plan and the Mayor's use of planning powers.
Police and Crime Committee	Examines the work of the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime. Also investigates key issues relating to policing crime in London such as the threat of online crime, youth offending, counter-
Regeneration Committee	Reviews the Mayor's regeneration functions and spending decisions, including oversight of the Mayor's Development Corporations.
Transport Committee	Examines all aspects of the capital's transport system in order to press for improvements for Londoners. Assesses the Mayor's Transport Strategy and looks closely at the work of TfL.

In addition to the numerous committees which oversee and investigate decisions of the Mayor and the GLA, there are other stand alone committees. These include:

- The **Audit Panel**: Concerned with ensuring the security and monitoring of financial systems. It ensures there is an anti-fraud culture within the GLA and approves the annual internal audit programme. It also considers reports on expenses and gifts and hospitality received by elected members/senior officers.
- The **Budget and Performance Committee**: Scrutinises budgets and performance in a wide variety of areas across GLA and its functioning bodies.
- The **Budget Monitoring Sub-Committee**: Supports the Budget and Performance Committee
- The **Confirmation Hearings Committee**: The Mayor must notify the London Assembly if he wishes to make an appointment to a senior position in one the offices they oversee. The Assembly may request that a candidate attends a Confirmation Hearing to answer questions relating to the appointment before making a recommendation.
- The **Devolution Working Group**: Considers London's case for further devolved services from central government. The Devolution working group also progresses the case for further devolution by developing practical solutions to unanswered questions on the benefits of additional localised powers.
- The **GLA Oversight Committee**: A body which approves policy and budgets, provides recommendations to the Mayor regarding budgets and monitors expenditure.

Islamophobia


The rise in the number of anti-Muslim hate crimes in the UK have been a cause of concern in Muslim communities for several years. Official statistics show a 44% and 43% increase in religious hate crimes respectively in the periods 2013-14 and 2014-15. Home Office statistics also reveal that racial and religious hate crimes continue to account for the vast majority of police recorded hate crime in the UK, almost 90%.

The regular publication of hate crime statistics by the Home Office in recent years has enabled a clearer assessment on the state of hate in the UK, as has the publication of statistics by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) on racial, religious and Islamophobic hate crime in London.

In July 2015, the MPS announced that Islamophobia in London had risen by 70.1% compared to the same period in the previous year (July 2014). In December 2015, the year on year increase was 68.9%. Figure 1, below, shows the steady increase in Islamophobia in London in the last six months of 2015.

The MPS is one of few police forces that has available statistics on Islamophobic hate crime.

Figure 1 Islamophobic hate crime in London, July - December 2015



Source: Metropolitan Police Service, crime figures 2015

Despite the easier availability of hate crime statistics, assessing the level of anti-Muslim hate crime in the UK is compounded by the method of recording the 'bias motivation' in police recorded hate crime data.

What is a hate crime?

It may seem a fairly obvious thing when discussing anti-Muslim hate crime to assume that individuals are aware of what constitutes a hate crime and how it differs from a hate incident. However, academic research on hate crime in the UK shows that many victims of hate crime are unable to identify when and why the criminal threshold has been crossed and when it is time to report an incident to the police or a third party reporting centre.⁸

Among problems contributing to the under-reporting of hate crime is a lack of awareness of what a hate crime is.

8. Chakraborti et al (2014) The Leicester Hate Crime Project Report, Findings and Conclusions. University of Leicester.

The legal definition of racial hate crime is:

“Any criminal offence which is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by a hostility or prejudice based on a person’s race or perceived race.”

The legal definition of a religious hate crime is:

“Any criminal offence which is perceived by the victim or any other person to be motivated by a hostility or prejudice based on a person’s religion or perceived religion.”

Key to tackling anti-Muslim hate crime, and other forms of hate crime, is by educating individuals and communities on what is a hate crime and who can report it.

Racial/Religious hate crime and Islamophobia

The tables below indicate the crossover of Muslim hate crime victims in racial and religious hate crime data.

Muslims are not a race but Islamophobia can and does often manifest itself as a ‘racist’ hate crime. Anti-Muslim hate crime cuts across racial and religious bias motivations making both categories relevant to the derivation of quantitative data on anti-Muslim hate crime.

The 2012/13 to 2014/15 Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) showed that Muslim adults were the most likely to be a victim of religiously motivated hate crime. Muslims were 12 times more likely to be a victim of religious hate crime than a Christian or a Buddhist, and adults in the Asian ethnic group were seven times more likely to be victims of a religiously motivated hate crime than adults of a White ethnic background.

Table 1: Hate crimes recorded by the police by monitored strand, 2011/12 to 2014/15, England and Wales

Hate crime strand	2011/12	2012/13	% change	2013/14	% change	2014/2015	% change
			2011/12 to 2012/13		2012/13 to 2013/14		2013/14 to 2014/15
Race	35,944	35,845	0.2-	37,466	5	42,930	15
Religion	1,618	1,572	3-	2,269	44	3,254	43
Sexual orientation	4,345	4,241	2-	4,584	8	5,597	22
Disability	1,748	1,911	9	2,006	5	2,508	25
Transgender	313	364	16	557	53	605	9

Data from the CSEW on racially motivated hate crime is shown in table 2 below. The data shows that adults in non-White ethnic groups were much more likely to be victims of racially motivated hate crimes than White adults, 1.0% of Asian and 0.7% of Black adults compared with 0.1% of White adults.⁹ Again, Asians and Black adults were 10 and 7 times more likely to suffer from race hate crime than White victims.

Analysis of racially motivated hate crime by religion is also revealing. It shows that Muslim adults were also more likely to be victims of racially motivated hate crime (1.2%) compared to individuals reporting Christian (0.1%) or no faith (0.1%) backgrounds. From the table, Muslims are a shocking 12 times more likely to suffer race hate crime than a person of Christian or agnostic/atheist background.

9. Corcoran, H., Lader, D. and K. Smith. (2015). Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2014/15 Statistical Bulletin 05/15. Office for National Statistics. p.19.

Table 2: Percentage of adults aged 16 and over who were victims of racially-motivated hate crime, by ethnic group and religion, 2007/08 and 2008/09, 2009/10 and 2011/12, 2012/13 and 2014/15, CSEW

	2007/08 & 2008/09		2009/10 & 2011/12		2012/13 & 2014/15	
	All racially motivated hate crime	Unweighted base	All racially motivated hate crime	Unweighted base	All racially motivated hate crime	Unweighted base
ALL ADULTS	0.3	93,123	0.3	137,344	0.2	103,601
Ethnic Group						
White	0.1	86,628	0.1	126,435	0.1	93,891
Mixed/multiple ethnic groups	3	555	0.9	991	1.1	971
Asian/Asian British	2.1	3,290	1.8	5,459	1	5,126
Black/African/Caribbean/Black	1.7	1,855	0.8	2,919	0.7	2,770
Other ethnic group	2	777	1.5	1,322	0.8	735
Religion						
Christian	0.2	72,171	0.2	104,370	0.1	66,564
Buddhist	0.9	432	0.8	636	0.1	422
Hindu	2	864	1.1	1,415	0.6	1,254
Muslim	2.5	1,882	2.2	3,378	1.2	3,001
Other	0.7	1,251	0.7	1,784	1.2	1,449
No religion	0.2	16,252	0.2	25,401	0.1	30,712

Source: Crime Survey for England and Wales, 2014-15

The risk of being a victim of personal hate crime in the 2012/13 to 2014/15 CSEW was highest among those with the religious group 'Other' (1.1%) or Muslim (0.6%) compared with 0.1% of Christian respondents. This means Muslims or 'Other' minority religious groups were 11 times more likely to be at the receiving end of personal hate crime. People with Black (0.7%), Asian (0.5%) or Mixed Ethnic (1.4%) backgrounds were also more likely to be at the receiving end compared with White adults (0.1%). Again, the statistics show that if you are Black or Asian, you are 7 or 5 times more likely, respectively, to be at the receiving end of personal hate crime.¹⁰

Statistics from the CSEW in 2010/11 and 2011/12 (combined) compared to police recorded crime in 2012/13 showed that 40% of hate crime incidents came to the attention of police in 2012/13. Figures from the CSEW for the period 2012/13 to 2014/15 showed that 48% of hate crime incidents came to the attention of the police.

The 2012/13 CSEW estimated the total number of hate crime in England and Wales as 278,000 while police recorded hate crime amounted to 42,236 incidents.¹¹ Based on combined data from the 2012/13 to 2014/15 CSEW, there were an estimated 222,000 hate crimes on average per year for the five monitored strands, while police recorded hate crime figures sum up to 52,528.

10. Corcoran, H., Lader, D. and K. Smith. (2015). Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2014/15 Statistical Bulletin 05/15. Office for National Statistics. p.16.

11. Ibid, p. 16.

Table 3: Percentage of CSEW hate crime incidents that came to the attention of the police

	2007/08 to 2008/09		2009/10 to 2011/12		2012/13 to 2014/15	
	Percentage reported to police	Unweighted base	Percentage reported to police	Unweighted base	Percentage reported to police	Unweighted base
All hate crime	51	516	49	666	48	409
All CSEW crime	39	24,935	39	34,314	40	20,718

Source: Crime Survey for England and Wales, Office for National Statistics

Under-reporting of hate crime clearly remains a serious issue, as can be seen in the low percentage of hate crime incidents reported to the police.

For the periods April 2013 to March 2014 and April 2014 to March 2015, we attempted to derive information on the level of anti-Muslim hate crime in England and Wales by seeking disaggregated data on the victims of racial and religious hate crime by self-defined ethnicity and self-defined religious identity from police forces in England and Wales.

The method is unsatisfactory given the level of ethnic diversity among British Muslims and the intersectional nature of some hate crime. Using a method reliant on ethnic proxy means that a range of Muslim hate crime victims are neglected (for example, White British converts or Somali and Nigerian Muslims). Nonetheless, by seeking information about race hate crime victims who identified as Pakistani or Bangladeshi, and religious hate crime victims who identified as Muslim, we uncovered a number of issues that hamper the quantity and quality of data on anti-Muslim hate crime.

We also identified the ‘hidden Islamophobia,’ where anti-Muslim hate crime incidents are obscured by their presence in ‘racially aggravated’ offences and discounted in assessments examining ‘religiously aggravated’ offences alone in estimating levels of anti-Muslim hate crime. We found that there were 5,395 racial and religious hate crimes in 2013-2014 and 5,724 in 2014-15 where the victim’s ethnic identity was Pakistani/Bangladeshi or religious identity was Muslim. This is greater than the aggregate of religious hate crimes, 2,269 and 3,254 respectively, in the police recorded hate crime data. The disparity highlights the need for a better method of recording anti-Muslim hate crime.

The Hate Crime Strategy published by the Government in 2012 and updated in 2014 did not include a change to recording practices among its commitments. However, in October 2015, the Prime Minister announced that recording Islamophobia as a separate category of crime would be made a mandatory requirement for all police forces in England and Wales putting the recording of Islamophobia on par with recording anti-Semitism.

The new system of recording Islamophobia will be implemented from April 2016. The introduction of the new recording method will require better training of police officers to identify and record anti-Muslim hostility as the ‘bias motivation’ when flagging Islamophobic hate crime. A report by the Mayor’s Office for Crime and Policing examining ‘Hate Crimes against London’s Muslim Communities: An analysis of incidents recorded by the Metropolitan Police Service 2005-2012’ identified officer training as a key recommendation to improve hate crime reporting among Muslims and incident investigation observing a ‘general lack of knowledge amongst officers about hate crime, cultural issues affecting Muslim communities and of external local support agencies that could assist victims of anti-Muslim or Islamophobic incidents.’¹²

12. *Hate Crimes against London’s Muslim Communities, 2005-2012*, Mayor’s Office for Crime and Policing, 2013.

National and local hate crime strategies

The Government released the Hate Crime Strategy in 2012¹³ outlining three key strands on tackling hate crime:

1. To prevent hate crime - by challenging the attitudes that underpin it, and intervening early to prevent it escalating;
2. To increase reporting and access to support - by building victim confidence and supporting local partnerships; and
3. To improve the operational response to hate crimes - by better identifying and managing cases, and dealing effectively with offenders.

The national strategy identified 23 action points in relation to the first objective, 16 in relation to the second objective and 14 in relation to the third objective.

The initial Hate Crime Strategy did not have a developed approach to Islamophobic hate crime as can be seen by the piecemeal, instead of integrated approach, and the broad, generic targets. And while the strategy noted a number of important interventions, such as “awareness raising materials to tackle anti-Muslim hatred”; “exploring the conditions that create anti-Muslim hatred and undertaking a scoping exercise to create an evidence base”; and included a sub group on “challenging the role of the media”, the greater part of outcomes appear to have had little bearing on the stated objective of tackling anti-Muslim hate crime.

The 2014 updated report identifies projects such as the ‘Big Iftar’, ‘commemorating the sacrifice of soldiers in World War 1’ and ‘supporting Remembering Srebrenica’ as evidence of project outcomes.

The subsequent resignations of Professor Matthew Goodwin¹⁴ and Dr Chris Allen¹⁵ from the Cross Government Working Group on Anti-Muslim Hatred, citing a lack of interest among Government ministers to take Islamophobia seriously, further demonstrates the low priority given to tackling Islamophobia in national hate crime strategies.

The Government strategy, however, does note the importance of local action plans on tackling hate crime and states “[L]ocal strategies for tackling hate crime should reflect the needs and priorities of local victims and communities, rather than priorities imposed by Whitehall. The role of Government was to set a national direction and support those locally-led efforts.”¹⁶

This means the role of the Mayor of London remains crucial in shaping local hate crime policy and approaches. Moreover, localised strategies ensure that victims’ needs are met at the level where they matter most: in the local context.

Hate crime in London

All recorded hate crime in London in 2014/15 increased 28% from the previous year from 10,861 to 13,902 according to the GLA Annual Equality Report 2014/15.¹⁷ Hate crimes in London accounted for 26.7% of all hate crimes that occurred in England and Wales in 2014/15. More specifically, 42.4% of all religious hate crimes reported in England and Wales occurred in London in 2014/15 and confirms the need for MOPAC to tackle this growing area of concern. Faith-based hate crime constituted 10% of all hate crimes in London in the year up to September 2014.¹⁸

13. HM Government (2012) *Challenge it, Report it, Stop it, The Government’s Plan to Tackle Hate Crime*, Downloaded from <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97849/action-plan.pdf> [accessed 01/01/16].

14. *The Guardian*, 19 October 2015.

15. *Huffington Post*, 29 December 2014.

16. HM Government (2012) *Challenge it, Report it, Stop it, The Government’s Plan to Tackle Hate Crime*. p.6.

17. Mayor of London (2015) *Mayor of London’s Annual Equality Report 2014/15*. p. 77.

18. Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (2014) *A Hate Crime Reduction Strategy for London*. p. 11.

The number of religious hate crimes which occurred in London in 2014/15 increased by 117.7%, from 634 to 1380 from the previous year. Between 2011 and 2015 the number of hate crimes rose 127.3%. In the same period, recorded race hate crime nearly doubled from 7983 to 11,594 (45.23%).

Table 4: Reported Hate Crimes in London (MPS and City of London) 2011/12 and 2014/15

Year	Race	Religion	Sexual Orientation	Disability	Transgender	Total Number of Hate Crimes
2011/12 ¹	7,983	607	1,234	120	74	10,018
2012/13 ²	9,383	631	1,132	108	50	11,304
2013/14 ³	9,453	634	1,142	108	50	11,387
2014/15 ⁴	11,594	1,380	1,555	178	107	14,814

Approaches to tackling Hate Crime and Islamophobia in London

The Mayor's role in tackling hate crime in the capital has become increasingly important since the Metropolitan Police Authority was disbanded in January 2012, being replaced by the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC).

MOPAC published the first Hate Crime Reduction Strategy for London in December 2014 following an extensive period of consultation. This partnership strategy was endorsed by both the Metropolitan Police Service and the Crown Prosecution Service, whilst it informs the work of wider criminal justice partners, local authorities, landlords, and the voluntary, community and social enterprise sector.

Three key objectives form the basis of the Hate Crime Reduction strategy for London: to increase awareness and boost confidence to report hate crime; prevent hate crime and reduce victimisation; and ensure swift and sure justice for hate crime victims.

In the Hate Crime Reduction Strategy report, MOPAC commit to working 'with local partners to develop local engagement plans that identify and provide support, advice and reassurance to those communities most likely to be affected by hate crime'.¹⁹

The 'rapid rise of online hate crime' is also highlighted in the Hate Crime Reduction Strategy.²⁰ In response to this MOPAC pledged to 'ensure that the MPS incorporates online hate crime into a wider strategy and approach to tackling cyber-crime'.²¹ Online hate crime via social media in particular is an increasing problem for British Muslims.

MOPAC has also established a London Hate Crime Panel to encourage cross-partner delivery of strategy and engagement with affected communities to understand their experiences whilst efforts are being made to develop a hate crime dashboard to increase transparency and support delivery of strategy. The panel has met three times, in May 2015, October 2015 and March 2016 although minutes are available online from only the first of these meetings. Greater transparency is required in the Mayor's consultation with victim groups as well as better representation of Muslim groups that work with grassroots communities on challenging Islamophobia.

19. Ibid, p. 28.

20. Ibid, p. 32.

21. Ibid, p. 33.

Moreover, £2.2. Million was invested in 2014/15 to 'ensure an enhanced response to high priority victims, including those targeted for hate crimes'.²² £600.000 has been earmarked for investment in hate crime service delivery in 2015/16.

Hate crime on public transport networks

Public transport is a further area where hate crime is a problem. As the Hate Crime Strategy report notes, 'hate incidents, anti-social behaviour and the fear of crime or harassment can affect people's willingness to travel, particularly if they have been victims or have witnessed such behaviour'.²³ Transport for London's (TfL) Single Equality Scheme has identified hate crime as a particular issue and is committed to making it easier to report hate crime, largely by improving its online reporting tools to better understand those who may be victims. Although MOPAC states that it will ensure the work of TfL is connected to the wider strategy of tackling hate crime in general in London, it does not set out specific actions to be put in place.

Transport for London currently records incidents which take place on public buses however hate crime as a specific category is not recorded. BTP are responsible for policing the railways across the country. They also police London Underground, Docklands Light Railway, the Midland Metro tram system, and the Croydon Tramlink.

Data retrieved under Freedom of Information reveals British Transport Police recorded 1,468 racial and religious hate crimes in 2014, up from 1,364 in 2013 and 1,351 in 2012.²⁴ Recent incidents in London include cases where Muslims women have been called "ISIS bitches", "Muslim terrorist" and in one case, an elderly Muslim male had his Zimmerframe thrown off a bus as he was verbally abused. We would recommend Transport for London to follow the example of Police Scotland and introduce a 'Transport Charter' to encourage victims to report hate crime on transport networks and to provide information on all available reporting options.

Third party reporting centres

Third party reporting centres (TRCs) were introduced in the MacPherson report to provide members of marginalised communities with means to report hate crime incidents without involving direct encounters with the police.

The MacPherson report, highlighting the problems faced by marginalised communities in directly accessing policing services when it came to reporting hate crime, noted:

*"all possible steps should be taken by Police Services at local level in consultation with local Government and other agencies and local communities to encourage the reporting of racist incidents and crimes. This should include: (1) the ability to report at locations other than police stations; and (2) the ability to report 24 hours a day."*²⁵

TRCs provide an alternative avenue for marginalised communities and serve as a vital link connecting vulnerable victims to the criminal justice system by channelling incident reports and other data to the police, and other human rights agencies.

Though local councils and police constabularies have adopted the practice of establishing TRCs, their effectiveness in meeting the needs of victims have not, in general, been adequately evaluated.²⁶ Research shows that victims of hate crime are largely unaware of the availability of options to report hate crime at places like their local library, citizens advice bureaux and council run 'One Stop Shops'.²⁷

22. Mayor of London (2015) *Mayor of London's Annual Equality Report 2014/15*. p. 78.

23. Ibid, p. 29

24. *The Independent*, 15 April 2015

25. MacPherson, W. (1999) *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry*. pp. 376-377.

26. Manchester City Council (2015) *Hate crime strategy document 2016-2019*.

27. Chakraborti et al (2014) *The Leicester Hate Crime Project Report, Findings and Conclusions*. University of Leicester. P. 75.

In order to assess provisions for Muslim communities in London, we consulted the MPS website and London Borough websites to ascertain the number of TRCs registered as third party reporting centres and the number of these which were specific to Muslim communities. The data shows an alarming dearth of TRCs that are dedicated to providing Muslim victims of hate crime with local reporting centres across the capital and almost half of the London Boroughs, we were unable to find information clearly displayed on Council websites indicating Borough-wide contacts for third party reporting sites.

With the emphasis in the national Hate Crime Strategy on local plans to tackle hate crime and support victims, the neglect of local provisions for Muslims is gravely disconcerting.

Hate crime affects individuals living in local communities. Whether it is hostility expressed by a neighbour, a stranger in the street, in a local supermarket, at school or university, or on public transport networks linking local communities, hate crime is a local problem and supporting victims should take on local solutions.

Tackling the far right

Far right extremism continues to present a serious security threat to the UK although it is often underestimated in a climate where an excessive focus on al-Qaida inspired terrorism obscures the nature and scale of the threat posed by neo-Nazi groups and far right social movements.

The threat spans both terrorism incidents and incidents of serious assault and criminal damage, while on-street protests by far right groups bring low level intimidation, harassment and violence to Muslim communities around the country.

In recent years, the far right's adoption of 'cultural racism' by which Muslims and Islam are portrayed as inimical to 'British values' and impervious to integration into the 'British way of life', has become more intense with significant animus directed at what they perceive as the 'Islamisation' of Britain. Though the revised Prevent strategy recommends police force areas to tackle 'vulnerability to radicalisation' for 'all forms of extremism', for Muslim communities, the threat posed by far right movements has long been regarded as insufficiently targeted in policy and by police.²⁸

While protests in towns and cities across the UK is the dominant modus operandi for far right social movements, these groups are increasingly engaging in provocations such as handing out Bibles in mosques, running 'Christian patrols' in areas with a large Muslim population, door-stopping local Muslim politicians and harassing mosque worshippers on the pretext of tackling 'Muslim grooming gangs'. The targeting of Muslim schools and of mosques, the latter on feminist grounds of challenging 'gender apartheid,' reveals the scale of intimidation and the palpable threat faced by Muslim communities.

The murder of Mohammed Saleem in April 2013 bears witness to the perils of racism and the 'real threat'²⁹ posed by far right terrorism in the UK. Individuals bearing a far right disposition who have been convicted of serious crimes, such as Zack Davies, who brutally assaulted a Sikh dentist in a supermarket in retaliation for the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby in January 2014, are a stark reminder of the need to tackle all forms of extremism without fear or favour.

The social media dimension of these networks, often enjoying online communities far greater in size than their physical manifestation in on-street protests and other forms of social mobilisation, point to growing concerns over hate speech online. Recent initiatives pushed by government and tentatively embraced by social media companies is a step in the right direction but the steps taken are neither uniform, across all strands of hate speech, nor to scale, given the sheer volume of communications exchanged on social media.

28. *IB Times*, 1 March 2016.

29. *The Independent*, 13 March 2013.

In the period 2012-2015, we counted 19 major protests by far rights groups in London, 3 in 2012, 5 in 2013, 6 in 2014 and 5 in 2015. Other sites of anti-Muslim on-street protests include mosques giving rise to a letter from Assembly Member, Murad Qureshi, to the Metropolitan Police Commissioner requesting “a rigorous and robust approach” be “applied to any application for permission to demonstrate in an attempt to try and prevent these demonstrations from happening in the first place.”

Moreover, in response to AM Murad Qureshi’s request for information on the cost of policing far right protests in London, the Metropolitan Police Service disclosed that £3.6 million had been sent from existing MPS budgets in the period 2012/13 and 2013/14 on policing such protests. Our Freedom of Information request soliciting information up to 2015 was refused by the MPS.

Combating online hate crime

In the second quarter of 2015, the GLA Conservatives, released *Report Hate: Combating Online Hate Crime*. Headed by Conservative Assembly Member Andrew Boff, the report looked to increase knowledge of the seriousness of online hate crime whilst putting forward eight recommendations to improve detection, reporting and prosecution of online hate crime offences. As noted by Chief Superintendent Dave Stringer, responsible for the operational implementation of the MPS’s hate crime reduction policy, ‘hate crime committed online is not only damaging to the victim of the abuse...it is damaging to other members of the victim’s community who have viewed the abuse’, which in turn creates a wide pool of secondary victims.³⁰

Whilst online hate crime is a growing issue, it is heavily under-reported. This is similar to the trends in the underreporting of hate crime in general. As MOPAC’s hate crime reduction strategy states, ‘while there has been an increase in all recorded hate crime, it is still significantly underreported’.³¹

Sanctions and crime outcomes for hate crime

The ‘sanction detection rate’ is a term used for resolved cases through police-generated detections.

The sanction detection rates for hate crime compare well with the MPS sanction rate for all notifiable offences. For example in 2014/15 racist and religious hate crime had a sanction detection rate of 39.1% compared to a 20.6% detection rate of all crimes. Despite this ‘the long term trend (from 08/09 to 14/15) shows a reduction in the detection rate of hate crime’.³² Sanction detection rates for faith hate crimes fell from 35.9% to 22.9% in 2014/15.³³

A Freedom of Information request submitted by the London Evening Standard to the Metropolitan Police seeking information on crime outcomes for all types of hate crime in the capital between 2011 and 2015 found that while racial and religious hate crime almost doubled from 7,989 to 14,111, the number of prosecutions and other police action for racial and religious hate crime offences fell from 3,343 to 3,056.³⁴

Addressing the scale of hate crime under-reporting and victim perceptions of low success rates for prosecution of hate crime offences will require stronger action by the Mayor’s office and the Metropolitan Police. Falling sanction detection rates and low crime outcomes need to be reversed if victims are to be assured that hate crime in the capital is being taken seriously by the authorities.

30. Ibid, p. 4.

31. Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (2014) *A Hate Crime Reduction Strategy for London*, p. 6.

32. Mayor of London (2015) *Mayor of London’s Annual Equality Report 2014/15*, p. 78.

33. Ibid, p. 79.

34. *London Evening Standard*, 7 April 2016.

Supporting victims also entails making them feel secure in those places which are often targeted by individuals and groups motivated by anti-Muslim hostility. In a speech delivered in October 2015, the Prime Minister announced “New funding is to be made available to boost security at faith establishments.”³⁵

Further improvements

Since the release of the MOPAC’s Hate Crime Reduction Strategy in 2014, some of the key actions outlined in the report to meet objectives have been carried out.

During National Hate Crime Awareness week last year, MOPAC launched a smartphone hate crime app. The free download allows victims to immediately report an incident, with the information going directly to the Police via a secure server. The MPS has developed, as planned, hate crime hotspot maps where it is possible to study the different categories and their frequency in a particular area.³⁶ Similarly, a hate crime dashboard has been created.³⁷

The Hate Crime Reduction Strategy for London also looked to support the implementation of Community Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conference’s in every borough, to ensure effective sharing of information, it appears that these are still largely devoted to domestic violence and abuse, though some boroughs seem to be including hate crime as a focus.

We are asking candidates to:

- Commit to a training programme for Metropolitan Police Service officers to properly identify and record anti-Muslim hate crime.
- Commit to evaluating third party reporting centres in all London Boroughs and improve provisions for Muslims to report hate crime in their local area.
- Commit to appointing an officer with speciality training on racial and religious hate crime to work with Muslim communities in all London Boroughs to improve hate crime reporting, incident investigation and community partnerships.
- Commit to supporting improvements to security at Islamic places of worship and Muslim schools across the capital.
- Commit to addressing the threat posed by far right groups and right wing extremism, including on-street protests and social media forums that foment anti-Muslim prejudice.
- Commit to improving Muslim participation in consultative forums including in Independent Advisory Groups across London Boroughs and on the London Hate Crime Panel.

35. Cameron, D. (2015) ‘I want to build a national coalition to challenge and speak out against extremism’. Incomplete Transcript, *Gov.UK Prime minister’s Office*. 13 October 2015

36. Metropolitan Police (2016) *Crime Figures: Latest Crime Figures for London*. Available at: <<http://www.met.police.uk/crimefigures/>> [accessed 08/04/2016].

37. GLA, MOPAC (2016) *Hate Crime Dashboard*. Available at: <<https://www.london.gov.uk/what-we-do/mayors-office-policing-and-crime-mopac/data-and-research/crime/hate-crime-dashboard>> accessed [08/04/2016].

Employment

The former Mayor of London's 2006 report, *Muslims in London*, highlighted that despite London's rapid economic growth, there remain large areas of disadvantage and deprivation, most notably in the Eastern parts of inner London – an area home to many Muslims, particularly of Pakistani or Bangladeshi origin. It was also estimated in the 2006 report that by 2010, 46% of London's jobs will require degrees as a minimum qualification, and as noted in the previous section, Muslims in London in 2001 were less likely to hold higher qualifications than the general population.³⁸

A comparison of Census 2001 and Census 2011 data displays that London's Muslims are more likely to be economically active now than they were at the beginning of the decade. Over half of Muslims who are economically active but unemployed are students; in comparison to less than half of the general population, and will likely have positive implications for Muslim employment levels in the future as more Muslims enter the labour market. Similarly, a large proportion of Muslims that are economically inactive are students. The percentage of Muslims who are economically inactive due to looking after the home/family, is now less than double those within the general population who are economically inactive in this category.

Despite the potential presented from the size and demographic breakdown of British Muslims, employment opportunities remain worse than for all other groups, the White majority and other ethnic minorities.

A large proportion of economically active Muslims continue to be employed in distribution, hotels and restaurants. They are also more likely to be employed in the transport and communication industries. On the other hand, Muslims in London are less represented in the Financial, Real Estate, Professional and Administration sectors, and it should be highlighted that these industries are often better paid. In other areas, Muslim's in London are employed at similar rates to the general population. Over a fifth of Muslims Londoners employed in 2011 were in Public administration, education and health.

Table 5: Employment of Muslims and the general population by industry aged 16 and over, London 2011.³⁹

Industry	All %	Muslim % (2011)
All categories	100%	100%
Agriculture, energy and water	1%	0.6%
Manufacturing	3.2%	3.0%
Construction	6.6%	3.7%
Distribution, hotels and restaurants	19.3%	32.9%
Transport and communication	11.9%	13.1%
Financial, Real Estate, Professional and Administrative activities	26.3%	19.5%
Public administration, education and health	25.4%	22.3%
Other	6.4%	4.9%

38. Mayor of London (2006) *Muslims in London Report*. GLA. P. 50.

39. Employment of Muslims and the General Population by Industry Aged 16 and Over, London 2011. Census 2011: LC6212EW, Industry by Religion.

2011 census data indicates that the Muslim working population in London reflects similar characteristics to the data recorded in 2001. Muslims in London continue to be more likely to be working in elementary occupations, and sales and customer service occupations than those in the general population. They also remain more likely to be process, plant and machine operatives. These tend to be semi-skilled and low skilled jobs. Muslims in London in contrast are still less likely than the general population to be managers, directors and senior officials, or those in professional and technical occupations.

Table 6 : Occupation of people in work, London 2011.⁴⁰

All categories: Occupation	General population London	Muslim Population London
1. Managers, directors and senior officials	12%	11%
2. Professional occupations	22%	16%
3. Associate professional and technical occupations	16%	10%
4. Administrative and secretarial occupations	12%	9%
5. Skilled trades occupations	8%	9%
6. Caring, leisure and other service occupations	8%	8%
7. Sales and customer service occupations	5%	14%
8. Process, plant and machine operatives	5%	9%
9. Elementary occupations	10%	13%

According to the Mayor's Annual Equality Report 2014/15, the gap in employment rates between all Black, Asian and minority ethnic groups and all white groups has fluctuated between a high of 15.9 percentage points in 2009 and a low of 13.4 percentage points in 2010.⁴¹ Whereas the employment rate of people aged 16-64 in London for the White British ethnic group was 69.7 % and 80% for women and men respectively, the rate of employment for Bangladeshis was 28.5% and 71.5%, and 35.3 % and 69.9% for Pakistanis. For Arabs in London, 33.1% of women, and 63.6% of men were in employment. These ethnic minority groups also fell below the average total of 62.9% of women and 77.3% of men in employment in this period.⁴²

Whereas 53% of Londoners aged 16-24 from a White background are in employment, just 33% of BME Londoners in the same category are in employment.⁴³ Similar to the findings of the 2001 census with regards to Muslims in education, the Annual Equality Report shows that 64% of BME young Londoners were participating in education compared with 46% of young White Londoners.⁴⁴

The Equalities and Human Rights Commission report, *Is Britain Fairer*, paints a stark picture of enduring employment inequality among Muslims noting Muslims experienced the highest unemployment rates, particularly Muslim men in England. The employment rate for Pakistani/Bangladeshi people remained the lowest in 2013 (48.2%) despite a significant improvement between 2008 and 2013. The highest unemployment rate in 2013 was among Pakistanis/Bangladeshis (17.3%). Furthermore, Pakistani/Bangladeshi women were less than half as likely to be employed compared with average employment rates for women from other ethnic backgrounds.

40. Occupation by of People in Work, London 2011. Census 2011: Table LC6214EW.

41. Mayor of London (2015) *Mayor of London's Annual Equality Report 2014/15*. p. 20.

42. Ibid, p. 121.

43. Ibid, p. 21.

44. Ibid, p. 21.

The high levels of discrimination faced by Muslims in the UK labour market was more recently evaluated using statistics from the Labour Force Survey, a quarterly summary of UK employment statistics. The study, by Dr Nabil Khattab found that Muslims are 76% less likely to have a job of any kind compared to white, male British Christians of the same age and with the same qualifications and Muslim women are up to 65 per cent less likely to be employed than white Christian counterparts.”

The proportion of those of working age who are economically inactive remains much larger in the Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups in comparison to those who would describe themselves as White. Whilst 18.9% of White British Londoners aged 16-64 were inactive in 2014, 37.6% of Pakistanis and 37.5% of Bangladeshis were economically inactive.

Figure 2: Chart showing proportion of people of working age in London with no qualifications (%), by ethnicity 2004, 2009, and 2013.⁴⁵





Figure 3: Chart showing employment rate (%) of people aged 16-64 in London by detailed ethnic group and gender, excluding full time students, 2013.⁴⁶



45. Annual population survey in Ibid, p. 124.

46. Ibid, p. 121.

Table 7: London Residents aged 16-64 by ethnicity and employment status 2014.⁴⁷

Ethnic group	Employed	ILO unemployed	Inactive	Ethnic group size**	% Employed ***
White	2,702,000	151,000	667,000	3,489,500	77.43%
Mixed/Multiple ethnic groups	95,000	13,000	50,000	145,400	65.34%
Indian	304,000	20,000	102,000	425,400	71.46%
Pakistani/Bangladeshi	184,000	24,000	125,000	355,700	51.73%
Black British /African/Caribbean	416,000	73,000	180,000	650,700	61.30%
Other*	405,000	346,000	219,000	660,700	61.30%
Total in all ethnic groups	4,105,000	316,000	1,344,000	5,735,000	71.58%

*This includes 'Chinese', 'Arab', 'any other Asian', and 'any other ethnicity'.

** Annual mid-year population estimates 2014 (released June 2015)

*** Does not include full time students

The disproportionately high levels of unemployment experienced by British Muslims compared to other minority groups in the UK was highlighted in the 2003 Cabinet Office report which introduced the concept of an 'ethnic penalty'. The term explains discrimination faced by minorities in the labour market when other factors, such as qualifications, are controlled.⁴⁸ The 2003 report found the Muslims suffered more from an 'ethnic penalty' than other minority groups. This was affirmed in the report by the National Equality Panel which found that "Muslims are paid 13-21% less than their White Christian counterparts of equal qualification". It further noted that while "all minority groups suffer some form of 'penalty'...Muslim ethnic groups suffer the largest 'ethnic penalty'." ⁴⁹

There remains a large income divide between White groups and BME groups in London. The Annual Equality Report 2014/15 states the "gap in median pay between all BME groups and all white groups in London remained stubbornly high, but decreased to 17.1% in 2014".⁵⁰ The Annual Population Survey recorded that the gap in full-time median earnings between all white groups and all BME groups fell from 20.1% in 2006 to 17.1% in 2014, though there have been a number of fluctuations, with the gap reaching 25.8% in 2011. The report therefore concludes that "the ethnic pay gap has remained high. Median gross earnings in London were £16.23 per hour in 2014 for all white groups and £13.46 per hour for all BME groups."

The Equality and Human Rights Commission 2015 report, *Is Britain Fairer*, notes Muslims have experienced the lowest (and decreasing) hourly pay rates between 2008 and 2013 and, along with Sikhs, have the highest pay gaps compared with those with no religion, earning 22.5% and 19.1% less, respectively, in 2013.

The Mayor's Annual Equality Report 2014/15 does not note changes made in policy to counteract issues surrounding London's Muslims and employment. It does however highlight implemented policy with the aim of improving the situation of those from BME backgrounds.

The London Enterprise Panel (LEP) is the local enterprise partnership for London. Chaired by the Mayor of London, the LEP continues to promote jobs and growth for London, and leads on the European Structural Investment Fund Strategy (ESIF). The report shows that 40 % of the Beneficiaries of European Social Fund Programme (to the end of 2014) were from BME communities. Similarly, 54 % of beneficiaries of European Social Fund programme (to February 2015) were from BME communities.⁵¹

47. Office for National Statistics (2015) *ONS Annual population survey, London residents aged 16-64 by ethnicity, COB, and employment status, 2014*.


48. *ibid* p.163.

49. Hills, J. et al. (2010) *An anatomy of inequality in the UK: Report of the National Equality Panel*. p. 114.

50. Annual Population Survey in Mayor of London (2015) *Mayor of London's Annual Equality Report 2014/15*. p. 23.

51. *Ibid*, p. 13.

Figure 4: Graph showing percentage gap in full-time median earnings between all white groups and all BAME groups, London, 2006 to 2014.⁵²



During 2014/15, the LEP also focused upon getting long term workless people into sustained employment in the construction sector through the Construction Employer Accord. 40 % of the beneficiaries achieving 26 weeks sustained employment came from BME communities whilst 39 % of Beneficiaries achieving 52 weeks sustained employment were also members of BME communities.

A report published in 2014 by The Work Foundation at Lancaster University titled *London: A Tale of Two Cities, Addressing the youth employment challenge*, focused on the issue of BME unemployment in the capital. It noted that policies and interventions do not target young people from particular ethnic backgrounds, despite lower rates of employment. In the report, the authors recommended that links were strengthened 'between the education system and the labour market', with the presumption that this would work to improve the employment prospects of young people from ethnic minorities.⁵³ They also stated that 'there is a role for outreach work to increase ethnic, socioeconomic and gender diversity amongst young people entering apprenticeships and other routes into skilled work'.⁵⁴

Cumulative data since the seminal 2001 report, *Ethnic Minorities and the Labour Market*, has demonstrated the comparatively high level of unemployment faced by British Muslims and the 'penalty' experienced in wage levels. More than a decade on, progress on reversing labour market exclusion and wage inequality has not shown promising results. With the concentration of British Muslims in London, the Mayor and the GLA are well placed to take credible steps to address these issues and deliver a strategy, with the co-operation of public and private sector employers in the capital, that gets Muslims into employment with all its attendant positive consequences for upward mobility, poverty reduction and social and mental well-being.

We are asking candidates to:

Commit to tackling religious discrimination in the workplace and address the low level of economic activity among Muslims through targeted interventions at stages of recruitment, retention and promotion.

Commit to establishing a taskforce to examine Muslim labour market discrimination in the capital and work with public and private sector employers to tackle the high levels of unemployment among Muslim Londoners.

⁵². Ibid.

⁵³. Hughes, C. and Crowley, L. (April 2014) *London: A Tale of Two Cities, Addressing the Youth Employment Challenge*. p. I.

⁵⁴. Ibid, p. I-II.



Health

The health of Muslims in almost all age categories recorded in the 2001 Census was worse in comparison to the general population. In 2011, the census shows Muslims are more likely to have bad or very bad health at all age groups. Although the proportion of younger Muslims (ages 0-49) in these categories in the age groups remains relatively small, they still consist of a much higher proportion than those in the general population in these categories. For example, as a proportion of Muslims in London as a whole, those in the age category 16-49 are almost twice as likely as the general population to have bad or very bad health – 4.7% compared to 2.7%.

In the two older age categories, 50-64 and 65+, Muslims with bad or very bad health make up a much larger proportion of the total number of Muslims in these age groups living in London than their counterparts in the general population. Whilst 32.2% of Muslims over the age of 65 have bad or very bad health, less than a fifth (17.2%) of the general population in this age category have health that is bad or very bad. Likewise, less than a tenth (9.9%) of the general population aged 50-64 are in this health category in comparison to 22% of Muslims of the same age.

Figure 5: Percentage of London population in very good or good health by age group and religion, 2011 census data.⁵⁵





Figure 6: Percentage of London population in bad or very bad health by age group and religion, 2011 census data.⁵⁶




55. General Health by Religion and Age, London 2011. Census 2011: Table LC3203EW.

56. Ibid.

A higher proportion of Muslims have limiting health problems or disabilities which effect their day-to-day lives than the general population. Despite being marginally less likely overall to have a limiting health problem or disability (perhaps due to a large young Muslim population), Muslims over the age of 16 are much more likely to be affected by a health problem or disability. The largest difference is the age category 50-64 where there is a percentage point gap of 18.6.

Figure 7: Percentage of Muslims in London with a limiting long-term health problem or disability (Day-to-Day activities limited a lot and day-to-day activities limited a little) compared to the percentage of the general population, by age group, Census 2011.⁵⁷



The Mayor's Annual Equality Report 2014/15, focusing on data up to 2013 states the gap in life expectancy between the borough with the highest male life expectancy (Kensington and Chelsea) and the borough with the lowest life expectancy (Tower Hamlets, 2013) for males, rose from 6.1% in 2000-2002 to 6.8 % before dropping and remaining at around 5 % since 2009-11.⁵⁸ Despite this continued gap, life expectancy for all Londoners including those residing in the poorest boroughs has increased year on year according to the Mayor's Annual Equality Report 2014/15.⁵⁹

The Greater London Authority Act 2007, requires that the Mayor sets out the health inequalities facing London, the priorities for reducing them and the role to be played by a defined list of key partners in order to deliver objectives.⁶⁰ The London Health Inequalities report noted that certain groups of Londoners, including those from a minority ethnic backgrounds are more likely to be on low incomes and that 'a clear health gradient exists for life expectancy and major diseases relative to level of income'.⁶¹ The Mayor's Health Inequality strategy encompasses a wide range of issues aims and objectives around the socio economic profiles of disadvantaged groups, including those from minority ethnic backgrounds. Whether improvements have been made to the health of those from disadvantaged backgrounds is therefore largely dependent on progress made in other areas including employment, housing and education.

In October 2014, the Mayor set up the London Health Commission, an independent inquiry to examine how London's health and healthcare can be improved. The Health Commission produced the 'Better Health for London Report' advancing 60 recommendations and ten ambitions for the capital covering issues from improving children's health to making London's

57. Long-term Health Problem or Disability by Religion, London 2011. Census 2011: Table LC3207EW

58. Office for National Statistics in Mayor of London (2015) *Mayor of London's Annual Equality Report 2014/15*. p. 128.

59. Ibid.

60. Mayor of London (2010) *The London Health Inequalities Strategy*. p. 8.

61. Ibid, p. 23.


healthcare services work better for Londoners. The new London Health Board is chaired by the Mayor and consists of partnerships between London Boroughs and the NHS to 'focus on progressing improvements in London's health' including 'health inequalities'.⁶²

Certainly, lower levels of wellbeing exist among BME groups and this can also have a negative impact on physical and mental health. As the *Explaining Levels of Wellbeing in BME populations in England 2014* report highlighted, high levels of wellbeing can add 4 to 10 years to life, and lower well-being is associated with poorer physical and mental health and longevity.⁶³ Individuals from BME groups in England are more likely to have lower levels of wellbeing even when socio-economic factors are controlled for which suggests 'there is some difference linked to ethnic minority status that affects self-reported wellbeing'.⁶⁴

The *Explaining Levels of Wellbeing in BME Populations* report found a number of factors including ethnic penalties when applying to work and inequalities in the Labour and education market affected the well-being of individuals from ethnic minority groups. Similarly, differences in treatment with regards to law enforcement, for example in the use of 'stop and search' by police forces, also impacted negatively on well-being. The drivers of racism, exclusion and discrimination impact negatively on individuals' feelings of anxiety, connection to their community and ability to reach their potential - all markers of well-being.⁶⁵

These factors contribute directly to health which is shaped by 'many different factors'.⁶⁶ As noted by the Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, along with often lower socio-economic status, a 'complex interplay' of factors including discrimination, racism, educational attainment, job security and poor delivery and take up of health care affect ethnic health.⁶⁷

Figure 8: Graph showing average life expectancy, Males 2000-2014: Two boroughs with the highest life expectancy (Kensington and Chelsea, Harrow) and the Two boroughs with the lowest life expectancy (Barking and Dagenham, Tower Hamlets).⁶⁸



62. Mayor of London (2015) *Press Release: Response to the Better Health for London Report*.

63. Stevenson, J and Rao, M (2014) *Explaining levels of wellbeing in Black and Minority Ethnic populations in England*. London: University of East London, Institute of Health and Human Development. p. 6

64. Ibid, p. 72.


65. Ibid, p. 26-7.

66. Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (2007) *Postnote 276: Ethnicity and Health*. London: Houses of Parliament, p. 1.

67. Ibid, p. 2.

68. London Data Store (2015) *Life Expectancy at Birth and at Age 65*. Downloaded from: <<http://data.london.gov.uk/dataset/life-expectancy-birth-and-age-65-borough>> [Accessed 20/01/2016].

Figure 9: Graph showing average life expectancy, females 2000-2014: Two boroughs with the highest life expectancy (Camden, Kensington and Chelsea) and the Two boroughs with the lowest life expectancy (Tower Hamlets, Barking and Dagenham).⁶⁹



We are asking candidates to:

Commit to delivering the recommendations proposed by the London Health Commission to address health problems among BME groups and the higher proportion of Muslim Londoners reporting ‘bad’ or very bad’ health compared to the general population in all age groups.

⁶⁹. Ibid.

Housing

In 2001, 15% of households in the general population lived in the private rented sector, compared with 17% Muslim households.⁷⁰ The Housing Corporation's analysis of the Census data found that both nationally and at local level, Muslim children lived in worse housing than other children. In London, 53% of Muslim children live in overcrowded accommodation.⁷¹

Overcrowded housing still remains an issue for London's Muslim population. By the 'occupancy rating,' which relates to the number of rooms available to members of the household based on the relationship between residents and their ages, Muslims have a higher rating than the general population. Whilst the proportion of Muslims living in housing with an occupancy rating of minus one or less has fallen by 15.6 percentage points, they are still more than twice as likely (Table 4), to be within this category than the general population in London.

Table 8: Occupancy Rating (O/R) of (bedrooms) by religion of Household Reference Person (HRP), London 2011 Census data.⁷²

Religion	All categories	O/R +2 or More	O/R +1	O/R of 0	O/R of -1 or less
All	3,266,173	689,538	923,221	1,282,883	370,531
Christian	1,689,578	406,551	489,852	625,219	167,956
Buddhist	33,607	5,008	9,317	14,647	4,635
Hindu	127,326	24,285	36,324	44,930	21,697
Jewish	61,889	22,845	20,197	16,179	2,668
Muslim	292,192	26,853	54,049	133,890	77,400
Sikh	36,858	8,112	10,510	12,379	5,857
Other	21,879	4,565	6,427	9,052	1,835
No Religion	724,394	132,907	217,031	313,791	60,665
Religion not stated	278,540	58,412	79,514	112,796	27,818

Table 9: Percentage of Muslim and general population households with an occupancy rating of minus one (-1) or less, London 2001 Census and 2011 Census.

Religion	2001	2011	% Change
Muslim	42	26.4	15.6
General Population	17.3	11.3	6

In the London boroughs with the highest percentage of Muslims, there has been a worsening in the overcrowding rate in the majority of wards. The wards with the largest percentage change in Brent, Newham, Redbridge and Waltham Forest have been positive, suggesting that the overcrowding rate has increased. The largest increase was 7.19 % in Wembley Central, Brent. In contrast, the highest percentage change in Tower Hamlets has been a

70. Tenure by household reference person (HRP), Muslims and all households, London and England and Wales, 2001. Census 2001: Table M324.

71. Sellick, P. (2004) *Muslim Housing Experiences*. Housing Corporation.

72. Occupancy Rating (bedrooms) by Religion of Household Person London 2011. Census 2011. Table LC4208EW.

decrease in the overcrowding rate, the largest being in Spitalfields and Banglatown which fell by 8.86 %. These areas of Tower Hamlets 'previously had high levels of overcrowding'.⁷³ Within these boroughs there remain a number of wards where the overcrowding rate remains above 10% and despite a number of wards seeing decreases in the overcrowding rate in Tower Hamlets, this issue remains problematic for residents in all five of the boroughs.

Tower Hamlets has been at the 'forefront' of plans to produce larger affordable homes in London. The reduction in the percentage of overcrowded households in certain areas of Tower Hamlets is a positive indicator of these efforts and the plans that have been put in place.⁷⁴

The Mayor's Annual Equality Report 2014/15 notes that there has been a fall in the number of severely crowded homes in London in the social rented sector for the second successive year, falling from 17 per cent in 2010/11 to 13 per cent in 2012/13. Despite this, the number of households accepted as statutorily homeless has gone up and the proportion of these who are from BAME communities has also risen.⁷⁵

Overcrowding rates in all housing sectors however are rising in London though they remain far below levels seen in previous years.⁷⁶ As a whole, 8% of households in London are overcrowded, and much higher rates of overcrowding exist in the social and private tenants than for home owners.⁷⁷ As the GLA housing in London report notes, 'overcrowding rates are highest in deprived parts of Newham, Brent and Ealing', areas which have a large Muslim population.⁷⁸

The 2011 Census indicated that fewer people in London now own their own houses than in 2001 with a much larger number of tenures being categorised as 'private rented or living rent free'. However, the proportion of Muslims in London who own their own houses is much lower than HRP's in the general population – 30.17 % in comparison to 49.5%. Similarly, the number of Muslim HRP's living in private rented or living rent free continues to remain much higher (33%) than HRP's in London's general population (26.4%).

Table 10: Tenure by household reference person (HRP), Muslims and all households, London 2001 and 2011 (census).⁷⁹

	General Population		Muslims in London	
	2001	2011	2001	2011
Owned/Shared ownership: Total	56.5	49.5	37.9	30.17
Owned Outright	22.1	21.1	11.4	9.24
Owned with a Mortgage/Loan or shared ownership	34.5	28.4	26.5	20.9
Social Rented: Total	26.2	24.06	40.3	36.8
Rented from Council	17.1	13.4	26.8	21.96
Other social Rented	9.1	10.6	13.5	14.9
Private rented or living rent free	17.3	26.4	21.8	33

* Figures may not add to 100% due to rounding

73. GLA (2015) *Housing in London 2015: The Evidence for the Mayor's Housing Strategy*. p. 96.

74. Cabinet Report (2013) *London Borough of Tower Hamlets Overcrowding and Under Occupation Statement*. p. 9.

75. Mayor of London (2015) *Mayor of London's Annual Equality Report 2014/15*. p. 54.

76. GLA (2015) *Housing in London 2015: The Evidence for the Mayor's Housing Strategy*. p. 83

77. Ibid, p. 83.


78. Ibid, p. 83.

79. Religion by Accommodation Type, London 2011. Census 2011: Table LC2120EW. And Religion by Accommodation Type, London 2001. Census 2001: Table M317.

The lack of affordable housing in London, specifically larger family housing, is therefore likely to have a greater adverse effect on London's Muslim population.

In Mayor Boris Johnson's two terms, 93,188 affordable homes have been built with this number likely to increase before the Mayoral elections of May 2016. However the completion rate of affordable homes in the capital is less than half of the Government projections which suggest that 56,000 new homes need to be built every year to accommodate new households.⁸⁰

Figure 10: Chart showing Affordable housing completions in London 2000/01 to 2014/15⁸¹



The importance of creating affordable homes can be seen in the *Housing in London 2015 Report: The evidence base for the Mayor's Housing Strategy*, produced by the GLA. Using data collected by the Land Registry, it showed that between 2005 and 2015 house prices rose in every London borough. In the most expensive borough of Kensington and Chelsea, house prices rose 158% whilst in the cheapest borough of Newham, an area with a large Muslim population, the average house price rose 42%.⁸²

The Homes for London Board, previously the London Housing Board, was appointed by Mayor Johnson and oversees the investment of his housing budget to maximise the potential of newly acquired land assets to deliver new homes across London. In 2014 the London Housing Board produced the Draft London Housing Strategy which set a number of ambitious targets, one of which was to halve severe overcrowding in social rented housing by 2016.⁸³

Affordable housing has been an aim of the present Mayor of London and the London Housing Board. This is an important issue facing individuals from ethnic minority backgrounds generally as they remain more likely to be unemployed, in part-time employment or in low paid jobs'.⁸⁴ The Draft London Housing Strategy 2014 stated that "the

80. London Councils (2011) *Affordable Housing Policies in London*. Available at <<http://www.londoncouncils.gov.uk/our-key-themes/housing-and-planning/housing-investment/affordable-housing-policies-london>>, [accessed 08/04/16].

81. Mayor of London (2015) *Mayor of London's Annual Equality Report 2014/15*. p. 55.

82. GLA (2015) *Housing in London 2015: The Evidence for the Mayor's Housing Strategy*. p. 65.

83. Draft Housing Strategy 2014, p. 5

84. Ethnos Equality Impact Assessment on the London Housing Strategy 2005-2016, p. 22

Mayor will seek to deliver 45,000 affordable homes over the 2015-18 investment period”.⁸⁵

However, though the Mayor should be commended for overseeing the completion of almost 18,000 GLA-funded affordable homes in 2015, the London Housing Strategy 2014 highlighted that 25,600 (52 %) of the estimated annual housing requirement is for affordable homes, the vast majority of which are funded by public subsidy.⁸⁶ Therefore despite an ambitious target of an average of 17,000 new affordable homes a year, this still falls far short of the required number of affordable homes needing to be provided in the capital.

As shown, Muslims in London are less likely to be in well-paid senior positions or industries and are disproportionately employed in sectors where wages and salaries are often lower. The primary means of supporting the aspiration of Londoners on low to middle incomes to become home owners is through the Mayor’s First Steps programme.⁸⁷ Through increasing the number of ‘intermediate homes’ available for those who earn between £10,000 and £40,000 per annum as set out in the London Housing Strategy 2014, more Londoners will be provided the opportunity to own their own home. However, with only 22,000 intermediate homes being built since 2008, it remains difficult for those in the private and social rented sector to move onto the housing ladder.

The London Housing Strategy also shows the large focus on smaller properties within the ‘Annualised requirement for new homes, 2014/15 to 2034/35’. Whilst 16,381 single bed homes and 9,034 two bed homes are proposed to be built annually, only 10,602 4+ beds and 12,825 bed homes are required to be built.⁸⁸ The Ethnos Equality Impact Assessment on the London Housing Strategy 2005-16 highlighted the issue of ‘lack of strategy’ with regard to tenure in the report which was published in 2005.⁸⁹ This appears to remain the case and is likely to have an adverse impact on Muslim communities who are more likely to have a higher number of people living in households.

It should also be noted that despite efforts to increase the supply of housing in the London Housing Strategy 2014 and more generally under the Mayor of London and GLA, there remains a lack of focus on improving the housing needs of ethnic minority communities in general. This was initially reported by Ethnos in their assessment of the London Housing Strategy 2005-2016 where it was highlighted that ‘given the lack of engagement with, and targets in relation to, the specific needs of various sections of the BME communities’ increased supply was unlikely to generate direct improvements for those from an ethnic minority background.⁹⁰

The Mayor’s London Housing Design Guide 2014, looks to introduce standards to improve the internal design of new homes and sets out minimum space standards.⁹¹ Perhaps more importantly for London’s Muslim population, who are more likely to live in social housing or in the private rented sector, the Homes for London Housing Strategy Report 2014 stated that it would provide funding to ensure all London borough landlords meet the Decent Homes Criteria set out by the UK government.⁹² The Mayor’s Annual Equality report also stated the Mayor of London’s intention to invest around £145 million in additional funding to “bring all council homes up to the Decent Homes standard by 2015/16”.⁹³

85. Draft London Housing Strategy 2014, p. 18

86. London Housing Strategy, p. 16.

87. London Housing Strategy, p. 28

88. Ibid, p. 15

89. *Ethnos Equality Impact Assessment on the London Housing Strategy 2005-2016*, p. 22

90. Ibid, p. 27

91. *Draft Housing Strategy 2014*, p. 20

92. *Draft London Housing Strategy 2014*, p. 23

93. *Mayor of London Annual Equality Report 2014/15*, p. 23

The Mayor's efforts to tackle the diverse range of issues with housing in the Capital may go some way to improve the lives of Muslims living in London. However, the London Housing Strategy 2005-2016, the London Housing Strategy 2014 and other policies produced by the Mayor's office appear to have little focus on the needs of BME communities living in London. The Ethnos Equality Impact Assessment on the London Housing Strategy 2005-2016 highlighted the need for different sizes of homes, for community and faith specific sheltered housing, for larger units of temporary accommodation, for multi-agency work with the BME voluntary and community sector and for outreach work.⁹⁴ It appears that housing issues relating to London's ethnic minority communities are neglected in the Mayor's housing policy.

We are asking candidates to:

Commit to building affordable housing in the capital to meet housing needs and re-creating a BME Housing Strategy for London to address specific housing problems facing Muslim Londoners.

94. *Ethnos Equality Impact Assessment on the London Housing Strategy 2005-2016*

Education

Data taken from the 2011 Census points to rising education levels of younger Muslims in London. Whilst those in the general population in both inner and outer London were still less likely to have 'no qualifications', the percentage gap was considerably smaller than in 2001.

Though the proportion of Muslims in each qualification category is similar in both Outer London and Inner London, the differences between Muslims and the general population remain considerably distinct, whilst this gap in Outer London is considerably smaller. For instance, Muslims are 10 percentage points less likely to hold Level 4 Qualifications in Inner London than the general population. In Outer London, this difference disappears with 18.4% of the general population and Muslims holding Level 4 qualifications and above.

Table 11: Qualification of young Muslims aged 16-24, London 2011.⁹⁵

	Inner London		Outer London	
Highest Level of Qualification	All People	Muslim	All People	Muslim
All categories: Highest level of qualification	100%	100%	100%	100%
No qualifications	7.8%	9.3%	9.7%	10.0%
Level 1 qualifications	12.8%	19.2%	16.6%	18.7%
Level 2 qualifications	18.2%	23.1%	25.9%	23.5%
Apprenticeship	1.0%	1.2%	1.7%	0.8%
Level 3 qualifications	24.9%	22.8%	22.6%	22.8%
Level 4 qualifications and above	28.1%	18.1%	18.4%	18.4%
Other qualifications	7.2%	6.4%	5.0%	5.9%

Looking at attainment levels among the Asian population, it can be seen that at Key Stage 2 across all ethnicities there are positive levels of achievement, with 'Other Asian' and 'Indian' having the highest proportion of those at level 4 in reading, writing and maths (87%), and Pakistani the lowest (81%). The gap in attainment between Asian ethnicities is currently larger however at key stage 4 where 63% of Pakistanis receive 5 grades A*-C compared to 75% of Indians. These improvements have been reflected throughout England and Wales as a whole, for example there 'were substantial improvements for Bangladeshi pupils who on average performed less well than White British pupils in 2004, but were above the average for White British pupils in 2013'.⁹⁶ In the same period, the attainment gap between Pakistani and Bangladeshi pupils narrowed considerably.⁹⁷

The GLA also provides data on the percentage of pupils at the end of key stage 4 achieving GCSE and equivalents in all boroughs. In 2013, those of an Asian ethnic background (and therefore more likely to be Muslim) were more likely in Harrow and Newham than those of other ethnic groups to achieve Level 4+ in reading writing and Mathematics. They were equally as likely as those from a mixed background to achieve Level 4 or above in these

⁹⁵ Qualification of young Muslims aged 16-24, London 2011. Census 2011: Table DC5204EW.

⁹⁶ National Institute of Economic and Social Research (2015) *A Compendium of Evidence on Ethnic Minority Resilience to the Effects of Deprivation on Attainment. Research Report*. Department for Education. p. 14.

⁹⁷ Ibid, p. 14.

subjects in the boroughs of Redbridge and Tower Hamlets. This trend has continued. In 2015, in the four London boroughs with the highest Asian populations, those of an Asian ethnic background were the most likely to receive level 4 or above in reading, writing and Maths. What should also be highlighted is the high percentage of Asian pupils who are receiving these grades. The proportion of those achieving Level 4+ exceeded 85% in all four of the highest Asian occupied boroughs.

Figure 11: Chart showing Percentage achieving level 4 in reading, writing and maths at KS2 in 2014, by ethnicity.⁹⁸





Figure 12: Chart showing Percentage achieving 5+ A*-C including English and maths at KS4 in 2014, by ethnicity.⁹⁹



98. Mayor of London (2015) *Annual Education Report 2015*. GLA. p. 40.

99. Ibid, p. 41.

Figure 13: Chart showing boroughs with the highest percentage of Asian pupils, GLA 2015.¹⁰⁰




Figure 14: Chart showing percentage of pupils achieving level 4 or above in Reading, Writing and Mathematics 2012-2014.¹⁰¹





Figure 15: Chart showing percentage of pupils achieving level 4+ at Key stage 2 in reading, writing and maths by ethnic group in the boroughs with the highest Asian population, 2015.¹⁰²




100. London Data Store (2015) *Percentage of Pupils by Ethnic Group, Borough*. GLA. Table 2014.
101. Department for Education. *National Curriculum Assessments at Key Stage 2 2012-15*. National Statistics. Table 25.
102. Ibid, Table 25.

The London Annual Education Report 2015 also indicates that structural poverty of ethnic minorities is being successfully countered through education. Despite the larger number of London's Asian families in lower income quartiles, the report shows that Asians had the second smallest difference in attainment based on pupils receiving Free School Meals in comparison to those who were not. Whilst 86% of Asian pupils not on FSM received level 4 or higher in Key Stage 2 in reading, writing and maths, 83% of Asian pupils on FSM managed to receive these grades. The gap widens (as with all ethnic groups) at Key Stage 4 and GCSE, with 75% of Asian pupils not on FSM receiving 5 or more A*-C grades, in contrast to just 60% of Asian pupils on FSM who obtain these grades. Despite this, the attainment gap is much narrower than other ethnic groups at both key stage levels of assessment.

As a 2015 Runnymede Trust report noted: 'poverty affects different students in different ways, and there is something different about the correlation between poverty and attainment comparing different ethnic groups'.¹⁰³ Simon Burgess, in his report highlighted that living in a deprived neighbourhood has much less impact on these Asian and Black students than it does on White students and that 'it is this difference that is principally responsible for the boast of the school system in London that it does particularly well for disadvantaged students'.¹⁰⁴

Figure 16: Chart showing the proportion of those receiving FSM (Green) and those not receiving FSM at KS2 achieving Level 4+ in reading, writing and maths, and those receiving 5 or more A*-C grades at KS4.¹⁰⁵



Few statistics associated with education are available in the Mayors Annual Equality Report of 2014/15 and London Muslims are not presented as a separate category. Despite this, data gleaned from the report shows the percentage of Asian pupils receiving 5 or more GCSE's graded A* to C increased from 65% in 2009/10 to 69% in 2013/14.¹⁰⁶ Similarly, the percentage of Pakistani's in London with no qualifications fell from 21.4 % in 2004 to 7.8% in 2013, whilst the percentage of Bangladeshis with no qualifications fell from 38.3% to 18.2%.¹⁰⁷

103. Runnymede Trust (2015) *The Runnymede School Report: Race, Education and Inequality in Contemporary Britain*. p. 19.


104. Ibid, p. 20.

105. Mayor of London (2015) *Annual Education Report 2015*. GLA. p.44.

106. Mayor of London (2015) *Mayor of London's Annual Equality Report 2014/15*. Chart 28.

107. Ibid, Chart 25.

Figure 17 Chart showing proportion of people of working age in London with no qualifications (%), by ethnicity 2004, 2009, and 2013.¹⁰⁸



However, improving educational outcomes among Muslims has not effectively translated into improved employment outcomes. In analysis conducted on graduate employment among BME students with level 4 qualifications, Weekes-Bernard argued that despite high rates of participation in higher education among some BME groups, there is also high initial graduate unemployment among Pakistani and Chinese men.¹⁰⁹



108. Ibid, Chart 25.

109. Weekes-Bernard, D. (2010). *Inequity and Access in Higher Education, Widening Participation and Race Equality*. (London: Runnymede Trust).

Data from the 2011 census shows lower rates of employment among Muslim graduates; 76 percent of British Muslim graduates are in work compared to 87 percent for all graduates.

The TUC has estimated BME graduates to be 2.5 times more likely to be unemployed than a graduate from a White background. With larger number of Muslims entering higher education than their White counterparts, the problem of labour market discrimination at graduate level, as at other levels, remains a matter of policy priority if the investment in education by minority groups is to translate into successful employment outcomes.

Bullying in schools

Racial and religious abuse faced by Muslims in schools remains a widespread problem with a review of counselling offered to young people during the period 2012/13 ChildLine reporting a 69% increase on the previous year in counselling related to racist bullying.¹¹⁰ In more recent times, Islamophobic bullying in schools has been correlated with incidents of domestic and international terrorism with school pupils reports a higher number of instances of verbal and other abuse which denigrates Muslim young people as “terrorists” or “suicide bombers”.

Incidents of bullying, motivated by racism, are likely to stifle the potential of students in attainment and subsequently affect their life chances in the future. The capability of teachers to deal with bullying incidents is therefore of vital importance so that schools are environments in which children prosper, not ones they fear or avoid.

We are asking candidates to:

Commit to supporting improvements in educational attainment levels among BME groups, including Pakistanis and Bangladeshi pupils in the capital's schools and address remaining disparities in the attainment gap between Inner and Outer London.

Commit to supporting London Boroughs in developing teaching materials to educate young people on Islamophobia, racism, and anti-Semitism; to fund projects to promote educational programmes on Islam awareness; to prioritise religious education in the national curriculum in order to prepare young people for life in a religiously plural, vibrant capital city.

Commit to strengthening powers of teachers to deal with racist and Islamophobic bullying in schools in the capital; support the education sector in developing Islamophobia awareness programmes for teaching staff to equip them with skills to identify and tackle hate incidents in schools.

¹¹⁰ ChildLine (2014) *Can I Tell You Something?*

Transport

The cost of transport in London is something that affects us all. Price increases however, are more likely to have a negative effect on persons with a low income as they constitute a higher proportion of their disposable income.

High usage of public transport by Londoners displays the crucial need for it to be both affordable, and accessible. Households in London are '1.8 times as likely to have no access to a car or van as those in the rest of the country with 42% of households in London, including 30 % of households with dependent children, having no access to a car or van, compared to 23 % outside of the capital.¹¹¹ Similarly, with regards to commuting, public transport is the 'most common way that people get to work – 48 %', with less than a third driving.¹¹² This again reflects the need for affordable public transport in the capital.

Research has shown that people on lower incomes are more likely to use bus services. 2011 census data indicates that 28.2 % of those utilising public transport in London took the bus. Transport for London data highlights that half of bus users earn less than £20,000 per year, and a third earn less than £15,000'.¹¹³

This is in contrast to '70% of tube users earning above £20,000 and 20% earning above £30,000'.¹¹⁴ Similarly, as can be seen in the table below, ethnic minorities in Britain are more likely to use buses in the capital than those from a white ethnic background. For example, whilst 31.5 % of black people in inner London and 21.7 % of black people in outer London use the bus, only 12.1% and 8.9% of White English/Welsh/Scottish people use the bus in these areas.

Table 13: Method of Travel to work by ethnic group, Inner/Outer London, 2011.¹¹⁵

Ethnic Group	Work mainly at or from home		Train, tube, metro, light rail or tram		Bus, minibus or coach		Driving a car or van		Passenger in a car or van		Bicycle		On foot		All other methods of travel to work	
	I	O	I	O	I	O	I	O	I	O	I	O	I	O	I	O
All categories: Ethnic group	10%	9%	40%	30%	17%	11%	13%	36%	1%	2%	7%	2%	11%	6%	2%	2%
White: Total	11%	10%	42%	30%	13%	9%	12%	37%	1%	2%	8%	3%	11%	7%	3%	2%
White:	11%	10%	40%	28%	12%	8%	13%	40%	1%	3%	9%	3%	12%	7%	3%	2%
White: Irish	10%	9%	42%	32%	14%	9%	12%	36%	1%	2%	8%	3%	12%	7%	2%	2%
White: Other	10%	9%	45%	39%	16%	13%	9%	26%	1%	2%	7%	3%	10%	6%	3%	2%
Mixed/multiple ethnic group	10%	8%	41%	35%	19%	15%	11%	30%	1%	2%	6%	2%	11%	7%	2%	2%
Asian/Asian British	10%	9%	42%	31%	17%	14%	16%	36%	1%	2%	2%	1%	11%	7%	1%	1%
Black British/African/Caribbean/	8%	8%	32%	33%	32%	22%	16%	29%	1%	1%	2%	1%	8%	4%	1%	1%
Other ethnic group	9%	10%	36%	30%	22%	14%	14%	36%	1%	2%	4%	2%	11%	6%	3%	2%

* Numbers may not add up to 100% due to rounding

111. Marshall, L. (2015) *Costs and Needs in London*. Centre for Research in Social Policy Loughborough University and Trust for London Tackling Poverty and Inequality. p. 11.

112. Ibid, p. 11.

113. Ibid, p. 15.

114. Ibid, p. 15.

115. Method of Travel to work by ethnic group in Inner London 2011. Census 2011: Table DC7201EW1a.

Given the importance of buses as a method of public transport for those on low incomes, as well as its higher proportional use by those from ethnic minority backgrounds, it is important to study the price increases since the introduction of the Mayor of London in 2000. As can be seen in the graphs below, bus journeys have increased significantly under the Mayor of London in his last two terms (please note that these are not in real terms). A single fare using an Oyster card at peak times is 66% higher price in 2016 than it was in 2008. Similarly, the Oyster cap on bus and tram fares increased by 50% between 2008 and 2016. TfL stated the increases in bus fares to be 13% in real values in the 15 year period up to 2014.¹¹⁶

These fare increases are likely to have a disproportionate effect on those from low income backgrounds and ethnic minorities who are more inclined to use the bus services in London. Higher prices of travel can have a number of effects on individuals and families.

It can for example lead to individuals choosing longer commuter journeys to try and mitigate the costs of more expensive but faster routes. A study by London Travel Watch showed that 36% of all London workers did not use the quickest or best journey option for their commute and that this was particularly the case for low earners'.¹¹⁷ Whilst two thirds of commuters choose their journey 'because it is quickest and best, this is less likely amongst very low earners'.¹¹⁸ This can have negative effects on physical and mental health. A report by the Office of National Statistics, published in 2014 found that commuters were on average less satisfied with their lives; rated their daily activities as less worthwhile, and reported less happiness and higher anxiety than non-commuters.¹¹⁹

According to London Travel Watch the number of those who choose their commute because of cost is higher in the 25-44 age group which 'could be an indication of the effect of higher housing costs or child care expense affecting this age group'.¹²⁰ Higher prices of public transport however remain likely to have a larger impact on those from low income backgrounds with regards to cut backs in expenditure on food and utilities.

Figure 18: London bus single fare including zone 1 with cash payment method, by cost, 2000-2014.¹²¹




Figure 19: London bus single fare with Oyster payment method pay as you go, by cost, 2004-2016.¹²²

116. Mayor of London (2014) *Travel in London Report 7*. Transport for London. p. 74.

117. BDRC Continental (2015) *Living on the edge: The impact of travel costs on low paid workers living in outer London*. Research report for London Councils, London Travel Watch and Trust for London. P.31.

118. Ibid, p. 31.

119. Office for National Statistics. (2014) *Commuting and Personal Well-being, 2014*. p. 4.

120. BDRC Continental (2015) *Living on the edge: The impact of travel costs on low paid workers living in outer London*. Research report for London Councils, London Travel Watch and Trust for London. P. 32.

121. Holdsworth, R. (Updated 2016) *London Transport Fares 2000-2016*.

122. Ibid.





Figure 20: Seven day London bus and tram pass, by cost, 2000-2016.¹²³



We are asking candidates to:

Commit to tackling fare rises for public transport services and making services run more efficiently to address the adverse effects of high public transport costs on all Londoners, and particularly those on low incomes.

Commit to a ‘Transport Charter’ to tackle under-reporting and investigation of hate crime on public transport networks across London.

¹²³. Ibid.

Crime, Security and Counter-Terrorism

In 1999, the MacPherson report made 70 recommendations to, among other things, improve trust and confidence in policing among minority ethnic communities with proposals ranging from racial awareness training for officers, complaints procedures and disciplinary protocols to tackle racism in police forces and for forces to reflect the cultural and ethnic mix of the communities they serve. Among recommendations advanced was recording data on the use of stop and search procedures and monitoring stops for bias.¹²⁴

Since the publication of the MacPherson report, ethnic minorities have been shown to be disproportionately affected by stop and search with the ratio of Black to White stops increasing from 5 to 1 in 1999 to 6.59 to 1 between 2010/11. The figure decreased slightly at 5.93 to 1 in 2011/12 falling to 4.25 to 1 in 2014/15.

In 2012, research conducted by the Equality and Human Rights Commission on stop and search powers under Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act found that the powers were being used disproportionately against people of ethnic minority backgrounds in police forces across Britain. It revealed that between 2008 and 2011 Black people experienced the highest rate of stop and search each year in that period.¹²⁵ Similarly, in 2013, the EHRC concluded that during 2010/11 and 2011/12 Black people were 29 times more likely than their White counterparts to be stopped and searched in some regions of the UK.¹²⁶

In the year ending March 2015, stops and searches involving individuals belonging to BME groups fell by 68% from the year ending March 2011.¹²⁷ However, BME groups were twice as likely to be stopped and searched as their White counterparts. In 2015, Black (or British Black) ethnicities were still over 4 times more likely to be stopped and searched, compared to over 6 times the likelihood in 2011.¹²⁸

Of the 539,788 stops and searches conducted in the year ending March 2015, 74,680 led to an arrest; an arrest rate of 14%. The rate is a 2% increase on the previous year, and despite it being the highest arrest rate since current data collection began, the rate remains pitifully low and an ongoing challenge to good community relations between minority ethnic communities and local police forces.

Race and disproportionate use of stop and search powers on BME groups

Since 2010, in a bid to improve relations with ethnic minorities and to address the problem of community impact and alienation, the number of stop and searches by police forces has fallen significantly from 1,284,025 in 2010 to 541,000 in 2015, a 58% decrease and continuing a year on year decline since 2011.

While total figures have fallen sharply, levels of disproportionality persist and the different stop and search powers have differing negative impacts on minority communities. For example, Section 60 stop and search powers are more likely to affect Black individuals while Section 43 and Schedule 7 stops are more likely to affect individuals of Asian and Other backgrounds.

124. MacPherson W. (1999) *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report: Report of an Inquiry by Sir William Macpherson*.

125. Equality and Human Rights Commission (2012) *Race disproportionality in stops and searches under section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994*. p. 21.


126. Equality and Human Rights Commission. (2013). *Race Disproportionately in stops and searches 2011-12*. p. 33.

127. Home Office (2015) *Police powers and procedures, England and Wales, year ending 31 March 2015*.

128. Ibid.

The disproportionate targeting of ethnic minorities in stop and search is also evident when comparing the figures with resident population size. Based on a comparison of stop and search with the resident population in England and Wales during 2010/11, research has shown that the stop and search rate for White people was 17 stops per 1,000 of the population compared to 112 stops for Black people. In 2011/12, the stop and search rate for White people was 16 stops per 1,000 of the population compared to 95 stops for Black people. In 2014/15, the stop and search rate for White people was 8 stops per 1,000 of the compared with 34 stops for Black people, a dramatic improvement.

Figure 21: Stop and search per 1,000 population by ethnicity in England and Wales between 2010/11-2014/15



Source: Police powers, England and Wales: 31 March 2015 (Home Office, November 2015)¹²⁹

Since January 2012, stop and searches have fallen by 68% in London.¹³⁰ The number of Section 60 stop and searches under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act have fallen in London by 98%.¹³¹

With regards to PACE and other stops and searches, statistics show large differences in the number of people searched depending on ethnicity. In the year November 2014 to November 2015, individuals from a Black ethnic background were, on average, three times more likely that an individual from a White background to be stopped and searched. Stop and searches of those with an Asian ethnic appearance fluctuated over the course of the 12 months, with the lowest being a ratio of 0.93 in comparison to stop and searches of those in the white category, and the highest being 1.07.

¹²⁹. Ibid.

¹³⁰. Metropolitan Police (updated 2016) *How we use stop and search*.


¹³¹. Ibid.

Table 14: PACE and Other Stop and Search (excl. s.60) last 12 Months vs. 2011 Census Population Data. December 2014 to November 2015 (Met stops and searches monitoring mechanism November 2015)¹³²

Ethnic Appearance	White searches per 1000 White population	Black searches per 1000 Black population	Asian searches per 1000 Asian population	Other searches per 1000 other population
	14.2	42.5	14.4	8.9

The subsequent arrest rates after stop and searches also vary quite considerably as shown by the Metropolitan Police data. The average arrest rate over the previous 12 months as a result of stop and searches is lowest for those in the Asian ethnic category (15.2%). In comparison, 18.5% of those described as being of White ethnic appearance were arrested after stops and searches, whilst 21.5 % of stops and searches of individuals in the Black ethnic group resulted in arrests. This suggests that those of an Asian appearance are the most likely group to inaccurately have stop and search powers used against them. The disproportionality of stop and search powers with regards to the Black ethnic group can also be seen from these statistics. Although those from the Black ethnic group were more than three times as likely to be searched between November 2014 and November 2015, they were only just over 14% more likely to be arrested than those who are white.

Figure 22: Ethnic Appearance of People Searched and Subsequently Arrested November 2014-November 2015 (Met stops and searches monitoring mechanism November 2015)¹³³




Section 43 of the Terrorism Act 2000 allows a constable to stop and search an individual or vehicle based on a “reasonable suspicion” that the individual is suspected of involvement in terrorist activity or evidence that the vehicle is being used for such purposes. 473 stops and searches were carried out in the year ending September 2015 by the Metropolitan Police Service, a decrease of 30% from 2011/12.¹³⁴ A ‘hit rate’ of only 8% of stops resulting in arrests shows the low level stop-to-arrest ratio arising from the use of the power. The impact on community relations is more damaging still.

132. Metropolitan Police (2015) *Stops and Searches Monitoring Mechanism November 2015*. p. 13.

133. Ibid, p. 8

134. Home Office (2015) *Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation: Arrests, outcomes, and stop and search, Great Britain, quarterly update to September 2015*.

Figure 23: Stop and search by the Metropolitan Police Service under section 43 (TACT 2000), by self-defined ethnicity



Source: Operation of Police Powers, England and Wales: September 2015 (Home Office, 2015)¹³⁵

As in previous years, the Home Office revealed an increase in the number of ethnic minorities stopped and searched under Section 43 between July-September 2014 and July-September 2015, compared to those who self-defined as White. Most noticeably, stops and searches involving individuals who self-defined as Asian or Asian British saw the largest increase, a 53% rise from the previous year.

A revised Code of Practice came into effect in March 2015 in relation to stop and search under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE)¹³⁶, which continues to account for the greater proportion of all stops and search, and in 2012, upon the enactment of the Protection of Freedoms Act, which abrogated the powers contained in Section 44 and replaced these with Section 47A, a Code of Practice was issued in relation to Section 43 and 47A stops and search. The revised Codes emphasise the importance of observing the threshold on 'reasonable suspicion' at all times when conducting stops to maintain public confidence in policing and for compliance with the Equality Act (2010).

Schedule 7

Examinations under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 allows border officials and police officers to stop and search individuals travelling through ports, airports, international rail stations or the border area. However, unlike sections 43 and 47A, the requirement for 'reasonable suspicion' does not apply to Schedule 7 stops. The table below illustrates stops conducted under Schedule 7 up to September 2015 comparing it to the previous 12 month period. Though White individuals are numerically greater in number relative to other ethnic groups, comparisons based on resident populations reveals the extent of the disproportionality in the use of the powers.

Despite Muslims making up only 5% of the general population in the UK, when comparing the number of stops experienced relative to their size in the resident population, the disproportional number of stops impacting on Muslims becomes apparent. Our analysis

¹³⁵. Ibid.

¹³⁶. Home Office (2014) *Revised Code of Practice for the exercise by: Police Officers of Statutory Powers of stop and search Police Officers and Police Staff of requirements to record public encounters*.

of Schedule 7 stops in 2012 found that almost 1 in 5 (22.9%) Muslims were likely to be examined for under an hour, more than 1 in 3 (35.9%) were likely to be examined for over an hour and 2 out of 5 of those detained under Schedule 7 were likely to be Muslim (41.9%).¹³⁷ David Anderson QC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, observed that ethnic minority groups made up a huge proportion of those detained noting that during 2009-10, ethnic minority groups made up the majority of those examined and 92% of those detained.¹³⁸

The Independent Reviewer also noted that Schedule 7 detentions and examinations were imposed upon members of ethnic minority groups to a greater extent than “their presence in the travelling population would seem to warrant.”¹³⁹

Figure 24: Examinations made under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 based on self-defined ethnicity





Figure 25: Detentions made under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 based on self-defined ethnicity



137. MEND (2012) *Consultation response on Schedule 7 stop and search*.

138. David Anderson QC (2012) *The Terrorism Acts in 2011*. London: The Stationary Office. p. 105.


139. Ibid, p. 105.

‘Suspect community’

The significance of the implementation of Schedule 7 is relevant to the Mayor of London and MOPAC due the number of passengers utilising the three London Airports – Heathrow, Gatwick and City Airport. The significance is furthered because Heathrow and Gatwick are the UK’s busiest airports.

An experimental analysis conducted by the Equalities and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) to determine the prevalence of race disproportionality in the practice of Schedule 7 stop and search powers found that Asian and Other ethnic groups were 11.3 times more likely than White people to be stopped and questioned.¹⁴⁰ Comparatively, Black people were 6.3 times more likely, while individuals of Mixed race background were 3.6 times more likely to be stopped and questioned than White people. In 2011/12 Asians or Other ethnic groups were 50.7 times more likely to be examined for over an hour at ports compared to their White counterparts. In comparison, Black people were 31.2 times more likely, while people of a Mixed Race were 10.4 times more likely to be examined for over an hour at ports than White people.

Figure 26: Race disproportionality ratios for total examinations at all ports, for three ethnic groups compared with the white group, 2010/11-2012/13




Source: Equality and Human Rights Commission statistics¹⁴¹

140. Equality and Human Rights Commission (2013) *An Experimental Analysis of Examinations and Detentions under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000*. p. 7.

141. Ibid, p. 23.

Figure 27: Race disproportionality ratios for examinations at airports: all examinations, over the hour examinations and detentions, for three ethnic groups each compared with the white group, 2010/11



Source: Equality and Human Rights Commission statistics¹⁴²

The analysis by the EHRC found that while the total number of examinations of Asians or other ethnic minorities at all ports and airports in 2010/11 was 46.6%, the figure increased to 63.5% when only taking stops and search at airports into consideration.

Further analysis found that 65.2% of over the hour examinations and detentions at all ports and airports were of Asians or Other ethnic minorities. The study also found that Pakistani, African and 'Other' ethnic groups experienced the highest number of over an hour examinations and detentions with Pakistanis 135.9 more likely to be questioned and 154.5 times more likely to be detained than their White counterparts.¹⁴³

The tables below, representing figures on Schedule 7 stops up to March 2015 show that individuals of Asian and Other background continue to be over-represented in the number of under the hour and over an hour examinations relative to their size in the resident population and in the travelling population.¹⁴⁴ The two categories are the principal ethnic groups which Muslims are most likely to fall within.

The Metropolitan Police came under scrutiny in October 2013 after the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) described the MPS as 'acting unlawfully'.¹⁴⁵ The Police watchdog claimed that Scotland Yard had failed to 'investigate claims that innocent Muslims were detained and harassed at airports'.¹⁴⁶

In August 2015, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of the Constabulary published *Stop and Search Powers 2: Are the Police using them effectively and fairly*, which studied the responses from the Metropolitan Police service to 10 recommendations made by HMIC in 2013 to improve the practice of stop and search.

The 2015 report showed the MPS made a conscious effort to improve its practice of stop and search in the 18 months between the reports. The MPS were found to have improved the guidance it provides to officers in respect to the use of stop and search, the Home Office

¹⁴². Ibid, p. 23.

¹⁴³. Ibid, p. 25.

¹⁴⁴. Anderson, D. (2015). *The Terrorism Acts in 2014: Report of the Independent Reviewer on the Operation of the Terrorism Act 2000 and Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006*. P. 27.

¹⁴⁵. *The Independent*, 10 October 2013.

¹⁴⁶. Ibid.

Best Use of Stop and Search Scheme and Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act.

HMIC commended the MPS for creating a formal policy guiding officers about their use of stop and search powers and 'were encouraged to find that the force...had developed a definition of effective use and included it in a 'stop and search narrative published on the force's intranet'.¹⁴⁷ HMIC also praised the Metropolitan Police for abolishing individual targets for officers in respect of the number of stop and search encounters carried out whilst in each borough, the force monitored the officers who had conducted the ten highest number of stop and search encounters.¹⁴⁸

The MPS were also noted to have responded positively to HMIC's recommendation of ensuring that relevant intelligence from stop and search encounters is gathered and placed on their force intelligence system.¹⁴⁹ The MPS were also found to have made arrangements for the public to scrutinise the use of Stop and Search in London, a recommendation stressed by HMIC in 2013. In addition to carrying out work 'to understand how the use of stop and search powers affects public trust', each London Borough had also carried out an assessment of the impact of the use of stop and search powers on equality. The MPS established Community Monitoring Groups to meet with MOPAC to review and consider information about the use of stop and search powers.¹⁵⁰

Independent Advisory Groups and 'critical incidents'

As a means of supporting community engagement and to enhance co-operation with communities in sensitive areas of policing, Independent Advisory Groups have been established at force level since the MacPherson report advised their creation to improve the quality of contact between police forces and the communities they serve.

In guidance first issued in 2008 in relation to IAGs, the Association of Chief Police Officers noted their value describing them as "a key strand of community engagement". IAGs play a vital role in providing police forces with a forum for listening to community concerns and help "anticipate how police responses to policing problems may be interpreted by different communities." IAGs serve as 'critical friends' to police forces and can play a useful role during 'critical incidents,' where a policing operation has the potential to affect community relations, as well as providing public scrutiny of, for example, a force's record on stop and search and tackling hate crime.

Critical incidents can include far right protests and other forms of social agitation that threaten to provoke violence and community tensions. IAGs serve as a means to enhance community confidence by providing regular, sustained contact between a police force and its local communities.

IAGs are composed of individuals drawn from local communities and are intended to be a reflection of the local demographic profile with representation from various minority and other groups. Many forces have details of how individuals can apply to join an IAG on their constabulary website.

To assess the quality of representation of Muslim concerns on IAGs via the membership of Muslim individuals who live and work within local communities, we submitted FOIs to all forces requesting details about the number of IAGs established within the force area and

147. HMIC (August 2015) *Stop and Search Powers 2: Are the Police using them effectively and fairly*, p.10

148. HMIC (August 2015) *Stop and Search Powers 2: Are the Police using them effectively and fairly*, p. 8

149. *ibid* p. 15

150. *ibid* p 17

the number of Muslim individuals represented on these. The Metropolitan Police Service declined to disclose details of IAG numbers in London and group membership across the capital.

Counter-Terrorism and Prevent

One of the most contentious areas of policing in relation to Muslim communities remains the role of officers in the delivery of the Prevent strand of the counter terrorism strategy.

The introduction of a new statutory duty on Prevent in the Counter Terrorism and Security Act, 2015 (CTS) has placed further strain on an already troubled relationship. The treatment of Muslim communities under the prism of security and the experience of being a 'suspect community', evidenced in the extent of racial profiling observable in stop and search powers exercised under terrorism legislation, has contributed to unease about growing aspects of the counter terrorism strategy and the descent into a "police state".

The lack of definitional clarity over the concept of 'British values', which lies at the heart of the counter terrorism strategy and which influences the parameters of assessed vulnerability adds to the confusion and condescension with which the Prevent policy is viewed by critics. The inchoate conception of 'British values' is just one of many criticisms advanced in assessments that conclude the policy is counter-productive to its objectives.

Rejection of a linear theory of progression and any causal relationship between non-violent to violent extremism and the low level of confidence among Muslim communities of an evidence based approach informing policy development in the field of counter-terrorism has compounded problems experienced at the operational level. The new duty has further heightened fears that the balance between liberty and security has been firmly tipped in favour of the latter with an especially punitive impact on Muslim communities and their human rights. The new duty has been described as having a "chilling effect" on thoughts and behaviours of innocent British citizens with Muslim communities unfairly affected by a policy discourse that privileges al Qaida inspired terrorism in depictions of the security threat faced by the country over the very 'real threat' posed by others forms of terrorism, including far right extremism.

According to data compiled by Europol, 'Islamist terrorism' or 'religiously inspired terrorism' accounts for less than 1% of all terrorism attacks on the European mainland in the period 2006 - 2014. A recent report posited the number of terrorist attacks committed by far right extremist lone actors in Europe between 2000 and 2015 as 1 in 3 (33%) compared to 38% that were religiously-inspired.¹⁵¹ The neglect of the scale of the threat from far right extremism compounds fears among Muslim communities of a distorted focus on 'Islamist' terrorism and an asymmetric policy response to extant threats emanating from all forms of extremism.

Of the 183 inmates detained due to violent extremism in the year ending March 2014, 32% were classified as "domestic extremists" with domestic extremism arrests increasing by 50% in 2014.¹⁵² In fact, from 1990 to 2012, 249 people have died due to right-wing extremism in Europe, while 263 have died due to al-Qaida related extremism, showing that in the long run

151. Smith, M. et al. (2016) *Lone Actor Terrorism: Policy Paper 3: Motivations, Political Engagement and Online Activity*. London: Institute of Strategic Dialogue.

152. Home Office (2014) *Home Office Counter Terrorism Statistics 2014*. Available at: <<http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/operation-of-police-powers-under-the-terrorism-act-2000-financial-year-ending-march-2014>> [accessed 18/08/15].

the two threats are roughly of the same magnitude.¹⁵³ However, the overwhelming focus of the Government's counter-terrorism strategy is on "international terrorism."¹⁵⁴

The widening of the scope of the Prevent duty and its placing on a statutory footing has prompted widespread disquiet about the role of officers as "thought police" in the delivery of the controversial Channel programme devised for the safeguarding of individuals suspected of vulnerability to radicalisation. The duty has since been expanded to cover a broader range of "specified authorities," local authorities, schools, the health sector, prisons and probation services and the police.

Deliberations during the passage of the Bill introducing the new statutory duty gave voice to fears of the encroachment on human rights and other freedoms, including academic freedom, if the duty were to be imposed. Those fears have since moved beyond the realm of the hypothetical with a rising number of cases coming to light of encroachments on freedom of religion, freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom of assembly as well as associated rights pertaining to the duties placed on the education sector in equalities legislation (Equality Act, Part 6, Chapters 1-4) and in the education policy document, Every Child Matters.

Police forces have come under particular scrutiny in relation to the Prevent strategy given the proportion of the policy budget which is consumed by police forces relative to other agencies and because of the centrality of police forces to the delivery of Prevent. The Prevent guidance relating to the revised duties on specified authorities states the police "play a galvanising role in developing local Prevent partnerships and bring together a wide range of other organisations to support local delivery of Prevent" and that "a key objective for the police is to ensure that Prevent is embedded into all aspects of policing including patrol, neighbourhood and safeguarding functions."

A growing area of latent conflict between police forces and communities is in the delivery of the Channel programme. The extension of the statutory duty to cover universities and higher education institutes, and the role of officers in 'risk assessments' in relation to, for example, external speakers on campus, has broadened the sphere of potential conflict by stretching the scope of involvement of officers in determining 'risk'.

Channel referrals


Channel is a police-coordinated, multi-agency partnership that evaluates referrals of individuals at risk of being drawn into terrorism, working alongside safeguarding partnerships and crime reduction panels. The risk to undermining trust and confidence in local forces is best captured in figures revealing the number of individuals who have been referred to Channel over the years, by age and by sector, and the huge volume of referrals which are rejected as 'not at risk'.

We submitted FOIs to all police forces in England and Wales seeking a breakdown of Channel referrals over the period 2013 - 2015 by age and ethnicity. The majority of forces declined to disclose the information. The tables presented below are from an FOI submitted by the BBC and from data retrieved from the National Police Chiefs Council.

153. Kundnani, A. (2012). *Blind Spot? Security Narratives and Far-Right Violence in Europe*. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague, May 2012.

154. Home Office (2014). *Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation: Arrests, outcomes and stops and searches, quarterly update to 31 December 2014*.

Figure 28: Channel referrals April 2007 - March 2014



Source: National Police Chiefs Council

The figures show the huge surge in the number of referrals since the Coalition came to power in 2010 and since, with the exception of year April 2011 - March 2012, when a slight reduction on the previous year took place.

Data showing referrals by Counter-Terrorism Unit reveals that the Metropolitan Police compare somewhat favourably to other CTUs in relation to the number of Channel referrals, see tables below from NPCC data:

Table 15: Referrals by CTU region (10 and under)

CTU Region	Referrals
North East	52
North West	86
West Midlands	126
East Midlands	44
Wales	6
Metropolitan Police	18
South East	27
South West	15
Eastern	41
Total	415

Table 16: Referrals by CTU region (11-15 inc)

CTU Region	Referrals
North East	237
North West	267
West Midlands	283
East Midlands	127
Wales	14
Metropolitan Police	178
South East	141
South West	87
Eastern	90
Total	1424

The tables show the number of individuals aged 10 and below (left) and 11-15, inc. (right) who have been referred to the Channel programme in the period April 2012 - 10 Dec 2015 by CTU region.

A question from London Assembly Member, Murad Qureshi, to the Mayor's Office seeking information on the number of Channel referrals involving individuals from Muslim backgrounds, elicited the following response: "In London, since the start of the financial year 2013/14, there have been a total of 485 Channel referrals who have self-defined themselves as being of the Islamic faith."¹⁵⁵

While the NPCC figures cover the age range below 10 and up to age 15, the period covered includes an additional financial year (2012/13). The figure from the Mayor's office is not broken down by age range and is not, therefore, directly comparable to the NPCC figures shown here which do not include information on referrals for the age range 16-21. From the numbers that are disclosed by the

¹⁵⁵ Questions to the Mayor of London, reference 2015/2916.

NPCC and the Mayor's office and the overlap for the period April 2013 - September 2015, we can assume that a greater proportion of Channel referrals in London during this time involved Muslims aged between 16 and 21.

Moreover, data from the NPCC reveals that 80% of Channel referrals exit the system at the preliminary assessment stage and do not require 'supportive interventions'. The Mayor's office did not disclose the actual number of Channel referrals in London that do not progress to require 'supportive interventions', in answer to a question from London Assembly Member, Murad Qureshi, responding only to state: "Almost all individuals accepted onto the Channel programme receive supportive interventions."¹⁵⁶

Linked to the problem of schools compromising the learning environment as a safe space for young people, is the issue of teachers being turned into 'spies' and being forced to monitor their pupils for 'signs of radicalisation'. The extent of 'thought-policing' that this entails and the creation of this 'pre-criminal space' – where no criminal offence is committed but a lingering doubt based on dubious training on the 'signs of radicalisation' - means that pupils are at threat of being deemed guilty of a probable crime without sufficient safeguards against wrongful detection and referral. The 'risk assessment' tools used in this exercise, from the Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent (WRAP) training provided to teachers to the software packages which automate the process by documenting keyword searches of words like 'jihad', 'caliphate' etc on classroom computers, are being used to construct this 'pre-criminal space'. The means and the process raise serious questions about proportionality and the unintended consequences of a response that affirms perceptions of 'institutionalised Islamophobia'.

The lack of transparency over training providers and the quality of training offered further cements the frustration felt by Muslim communities with Prevent. As with those selected to deliver 'de-radicalisation' packages or 'one to one mentoring' as part of a supportive intervention devised by a Multi Agency Supporting Hub, the lack of openness about who delivers the training, what the training consists of and quality assurance processes, to evaluate the effectiveness and relevance of the materials, contributes to the sense of unease. An absence of transparency and public scrutiny of Prevent delivery engenders fear and mistrust.

A London Prevent Board exists in the capital which "brings together all the government agencies and various other agencies that are working on Prevent in London". Though it has been described as a space to share good practice, discuss risks and provide a mechanism for senior officials from local authorities to feed information about Prevent work back into their local borough, communities are not able to feed information directly into the board. Prevent coordinators from priority boroughs make up much of the membership of the board and other members include government departments, the Metropolitan Police Service and MOPAC.

The Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime is unable to evaluate the Prevent activity in London due to the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism holding the list of projects being delivered. The Preventing Extremism in London report notes that "it is difficult to establish what, why and how decisions have been taken in respect of preventing extremism," which may compound the suspicions already found in Muslim communities towards Prevent.

In July 2015, the London CONTEST board was set up, aiming to replicate similar models in Cardiff and Birmingham. It aims to standardise reporting and encourage the sharing of good practices. Both MOPAC and the Crime and Security Committee have welcomed suggestions of more local involvement in the commissioning of Prevent, and believe that through more local knowledge, projects can be delivered by organisations that are seen as highly credible by London's communities. A key point of assessing the Mayor's progress on community consultation will be the inclusion of credible and respected Muslim community organisations in consultative forums to discuss, evaluate and feedback on Prevent projects in London and community impact.

156. Question to the Mayor of London, reference 2015/3864.

Sir Peter Fahy, the former chief constable of Greater Manchester Police, addressing the potential for officers to be drawn into areas that have no bearing on policing and which encroach upon fundamental freedoms has said aspects of the Government's counter extremism policy risks turning officers into "thought police ... policing religion and not just Muslims."¹⁵⁷

In his 2015 annual review report, the Independent Reviewer, referring to the proposed Extremism Bill and plans to introduce extremism disruption orders and banning orders for mosques warned, "If the wrong decisions are taken, the new law risks provoking a backlash in affected communities, hardening perceptions of an illiberal or Islamophobic approach, alienating those whose integration into British society is already fragile and playing into the hands of those who, by peddling a grievance agenda, seek to drive people further towards extremism and terrorism."¹⁵⁸

Police diversity

The MacPherson report in 1999 iterated a concern about the low level of BME representation in the police force. One of the recommendations proposed in the Cattle report into the race riots in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford in the summer of 2001, was the need for "new and radical measures" for BME recruitment to the police.

Since the publication of the MacPherson report, ethnic minority officers within police forces in England and Wales have not substantially increased. This was exemplified in a Home Affairs Committee report in 2013, which revealed that of the 134,101 officers in the police force, only 6,615 (4%) were from ethnic minority backgrounds with only a 1% increase in the number of minority ethnic officers recruited to the force between March 2011 and March 2012.¹⁵⁹

More recently, Home Office figures for March 2013 revealed that there were 6,555 BME police officers in the 43 forces of England and Wales, accounting for 5% of all officers, a figure that remained unchanged on the previous year. Between 2013 and 2015, a small increase in the proportion of BME officers recruited to the force was observed though the 6% rate reached remained lower than the 7% target set by the Home Office.

In the last decade, the number of BME officers has doubled from 3% to 6% though this is far lower than the proportion of BME people in the general population; 14.1%. In the Metropolitan Police, less than 2% of BME officers are above the rank of constable and less than 1% are the rank of Chief inspector or above.

Table 17: Metropolitan Police. Police officers, by police force area, ethnicity and gender, as at 31 March 2015. Police workforce, England and Wales: 31 March 2015.¹⁶⁰

Gender	White	Mixed	Black or Black British	Asian or Asian British	Chinese or other ethnic group	Not stated	Total
Male	20,890	596	646	1140	426	21	23,719
Female	7,229	246	262	284	123	8	8,158

157. *The Guardian*, 19 October 2015.

158. Anderson, D. QC. (2015) *The Terrorism Acts in 2014*. P. 65.

159. Home Affairs Committee (2013) *Third Report: Leadership and standards in the police: ethnic make-up by police force*. London: The Stationary Office. P. 30.

160. Home Office (2015) *Police Work Force England and Wales: 31 March 2015*. Table 8.

Newly published data under Freedom of Information Act requests obtained by the Guardian newspaper 'paint the most complete picture yet of a police service in which people from ethnic minorities are represented in disproportionately low numbers and have less chance than their white counterparts of getting jobs when they do apply'.¹⁶¹ The figures show that 31 out of the UK's 45 police forces appoint a greater proportion of white applicants than those who identify themselves as minority ethnic.

Of the 43 forces in England and Wales, the Metropolitan Police had the largest proportion of Minority Ethnic officers as of the end of March 2015 (11.7%).¹⁶² However the Met, the West Midlands and Bedfordshire police forces are among the least representative of the populations they serve, followed by the City of London, West Yorkshire, Greater Manchester and Surrey.¹⁶³

Figures published by the Guardian newspaper in early January 2016 show that more than three quarters of the police forces in the UK received a disproportionately low number of applications from BME communities. 'The Met, as well as the Bedfordshire and West Midlands forces, had among the greatest discrepancies'.¹⁶⁴

We are asking candidates to:

Commit to fostering social cohesion and community resilience to all forms of extremism; support de-radicalisation programmes that work with Muslim communities not against them.

Commit to curbing the encroachment of counter-terrorism policies on civil liberties.

Commit to enforcing the 10 recommendations proposed by HMIC on improving the use of stop and search and compliance with the 'Best use of stop and search scheme'.

Commit to train officers in detecting 'unconscious bias' to improve stop and search 'hit rates' and consistently demonstrate grounds for 'reasonable suspicion'

Commit to increasing recruitment, retention and promotion of BME officers with clear plans to improve diversity in senior ranks of the Metropolitan Police Service.

Commit to publishing comprehensive data on Channel referrals annually on the MOPAC and MPS websites.

Commit to holding regular public meetings with local communities in order to dispel the lack of transparency about Prevent delivery and to enhance trust and confidence in police roles on programme delivery.

161. *The Guardian*, 1st January 2016.

162. 'Home Office (2015) *Police Work Force England and Wales: 31 March 2015*.

163. *The Guardian*, 1 January 2016.

164. *Ibid*.

Arts and Culture

Statistics show that museum visitor numbers in London has increased across all groups. Recent data from the Home office also shows the number of ethnic minorities visiting museums or galleries increased from 35.4% in 2005 to 42.9% in 2015.

Despite this, it can be seen that the percentage gap between people from a white ethnic background who visited a museum or gallery and those who were black or minority ethnic has remained considerably different. The smallest percentage difference was in 2013/14 where 53.6% of people from a white ethnic background visited, in comparison to 49.3% of those that were BAME. The largest difference occurred just a year later (2014/15) however – 53.2% of those from a white ethnic background claimed that they had visited a museum or gallery in the past year in contrast to 42.9% from a BAME background.

The landscape of museum and gallery visitors is changing. A report by the Arts Council in 2011 for example noted 'it is now known that younger ethnic minority people are as likely to attend museums as their white counterparts'.¹⁶⁵ There also appears to have been a slight increase in the proportion of Londoners visiting museums and galleries, though this has fluctuated each year by at least 2 percentage points.

Table 18: Proportion who have visited a museum or gallery in the last year up to 2015/16 Quarter 2, England.¹⁶⁶

	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08	2008/09	2009/10	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15
White	43%	42.3%	44%	44%	46.7%	47.3%	49.4%	53.7%	53.6%	53.2%
BAME	35.4%	33.6%	39.3%	36.9%	40.1%	37.7%	44.4%	45%	49.3%	42.9%

Table 19: Proportion who have visited a museum or gallery in the last year, London 2009-2015.¹⁶⁷

	2009/10	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15
London	55.2%	53.1%	55.3%	57.4%	61.1%	56.4%

Museums are still however, less used by those on lower incomes. As BAME populations are more likely to be in the lowest income quartiles, this may negatively affect their attendance to museums, galleries and other spaces of cultural display. Whilst reduced poverty levels and higher incomes across London's population would likely increase the number of visitors to museums and galleries, other efforts should be made to increase the numbers of those from BAME and low income backgrounds utilising museums and art galleries in the capital. As can be seen in the table below, despite similar increases in museum and gallery attendance between 2005 and 2015, a percentage gap in attendance of over 20 percentage points remains in England.

¹⁶⁵ Smithies, R. 2011. *Arts Council England's Report. A Review of Research and Literature on Museums and Libraries*. p. 21

¹⁶⁶ *Proportion who have visited a museum or gallery in the last year in Taking Part 2015/16 quarter 2 statistical release 2005-2015*. Office of National Statistics: Table 3.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid, Table 2.

Table 20: Proportion who have visited a museum or gallery in the last year by economic profile, England.¹⁶⁸

	05/06	06/07	07/08	08/09	09/10	10/11	11/12	12/13	13/14	14/15
Upper socio economic group	51.9%	50.6%	52.3%	52.5%	55.2%	56.3%	57.8%	61.6%	62.7	60.0%
Lower socio economic group	28.3%	28.2%	30.6%	30.0%	32.1%	32.5%	35.4%	39.5%	38.8%	38.9%

A brief audit of the websites of some of the largest and most prestigious museums shows they are taking outreach to ethnic minority groups seriously. A few examples are:

- The British Museum has carried out outreach work with young people in Brent, focusing on local and international identity.¹⁶⁹
- The strategic plan in 2014/15 for the Victoria and Albert Museum stated that to support the increase in visitor numbers, the Museum will ‘maintain levels of visits by Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic Audiences, lower socio-economic audiences and visitors with disabilities’.¹⁷⁰
- The Imperial War Museum’s ‘In Touch’ volunteer programme looked to recruit people from a large range of backgrounds, including those from ethnic minorities.¹⁷¹

It is also important to study the makeup of the workforce in museums and galleries. As the London Museums Group has recently noted, ‘increased diversity in the museum workforce is a long discussed topic but without momentous change’¹⁷². Recent statistics have shown that the demographic of the population is not represented in the museum work forces. Figures ‘released in the ACE’s ‘Equality, Diversity and the Creative Case’ report, concludes that while the BAME population is 18%, only 3% are employed in Major Partner Museums’.¹⁷³

A lack of diversity within the museum work force is likely to lead to issues of representation, which in turn may disenfranchise and discourage participation from minority groups.¹⁷⁴

Sara Wajid explained in a talk at the Museums Association Conference 2015 that “unless salaries are changed in the Museum sector, and in the cultural industry in general, second generation immigrants and those from lower economic classes who strive for financial community are likely to be pushed away.”¹⁷⁵

Certainly, diversification of the workforce is likely to lead to a broader audience consisting of different ethnic and social backgrounds— something that the Department for Culture, Media and Sport has strived for. Having a ‘diverse workforce enables vast connections to wider communities and greater partnerships to move in’.¹⁷⁶

Among cultural activities held in London in the past few years, some with the backing of the Mayor of London’s office are: Eid in the Square, Arab Cultural Festival (Shubbak) in 2011/2013/2015 and the London Mela Festival.

168. Ibid, Table 3.

169. The British Museum (2016) *The World in Our City: Young Voices From Brent*.

170. V & A (2014) *Iteration of the Strategic Plan 2014/15*. p. 6.

171. Imperial War Museum (2011) *Equality Strategy 2007-10: Progress Review*. p. 20.

172. Solicari, S. (2016) *The Case for Diversity in the Museum Work Force*. London Museums Group.

173. Ibid.

174. Ibid.

175. Ibid.

176. Ibid.

Other private and public funded cultural activities exhibiting Islam include

- Victoria and Albert:
 - Islamic Art and other exhibitions opened
- British Museum
 - Exhibition on the Hajj, 2012
 - New Islamic Art Gallery, opened 2015
- Science Museum
 - Exhibition 1001 Inventions, 2010
- Theatre
 - National Theatre production *Dara*, originally performed in Pakistan, 2015
 - Tricycle Theatre, *Multitudes*, looking at conversion to Islam, 2015
 - National Youth Theatre, *Homegrown*, subsequently cancelled.
 - Theatre Royal Stratford East, *The Infidel*, 2014

We are asking candidates to:

Commit to supporting London's museums and galleries in outreach initiatives to BME communities thereby extending visitor base to include marginalised groups and facilitate the use of the capital's arts and culture scene to bring diverse communities together by organising more exhibitions and cultural events about Islam and British Muslims.



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